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Abuse of law 395
PROHIBITION OF ABUSE OF (COMMUNITY) LAW: THE CREATION OF 
A NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EC LAW THROUGH TAX
RITA DE LA FERIA*
1. Introduction: Thirty years of abuse
The Court of Justice has been alluding to abuse and abusive practices in its 
rulings for more than thirty years.1 For a long time, however, the signiﬁ cance 
of these references was unclear. Several factors might have contributed to this 
lack of clarity. First, it is certainly signiﬁ cant that abuse of rights is not a con-
cept familiar to the legal systems of all Member States. Some domestic legal 
systems include the principle, others do not; amongst those that do, some give 
the principle a broad scope of application, others a more restrictive one. Over-
all, it can be said that civil law systems generally accept the principle of abuse 
of rights to some degree. In France, where the principle is believed to have 
been developed, the principle has very wide application,2 whilst in other civil 
law countries, such as Germany, the application of the principle is more lim-
ited. Conversely, common law systems, namely those of the United Kingdom 
and Ireland, do not recognize the principle; the same applies to Denmark and 
other Nordic systems, which follow the common law approach.3
Second, the Court has not always adopted a coherent approach regarding the 
terminology used to describe abusive practices. In fact, for many years the 
∗ Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Business Taxation, University of Oxford. I am grateful 
to Dimitrios Doukas, Stephen Weatherill and Stefan Vogenauer for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.
1. The ﬁ rst ruling where the Court refers to abusive practices appears to have been Case 
33/74, Johannes Henricus Maria van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid, [1974] ECR 1299, (Van Binsbergen), concerning free movement of services. 
For an analysis of this case, see below section 2.1.
2. See Bell et al., Principles of French law (OUP, 1998), at pp. 364–366.
3. For a more detailed analysis of Member States’ approach to the principle of abuse of 
rights, see Brown, “Is there a general principle of abuse of rights in European Community 
Law?”, in Heukel and Curtin (Eds.), Institutional Dynamics of European Integration, Vol. II, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp. 511–525, at 513–515. Also, for a comprehensive over-
view of the French notion of abuse of rights, albeit from a tax perspective, see Harris, “Abus de 
droit in the ﬁ eld of Value Added Taxation”, (2003) British Tax Review (“BTR”), 131–152, at 
132–136.
Common Market Law Review 45: 395–441, 2008
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Court used words such as “avoidance”,4 “evasion”,5 “circumvention”,6 “fraud”7 
and “abuse”,8 in an apparently interchangeable fashion.9 Moreover, two of 
those words were sometimes used in the same sentence, separated solely by 
the conjunction “or”, and thus implicitly indicating that the Court considered 
these terms to be synonymous.10 This terminological confusion was also re-
ﬂ ected in the literature, with a prime example being the reference by some 
commentators to the “circumvention principle”,11 others to the “Van Binsber-
gen principle”,12 and yet others to the “evasion principle”,13 instead of the prin-
ciple of abuse or abusive practices. Only in the late 1990s, and in particular 
since the judgment in Emsland-Stärke, has the Court consistently referred to 
“abuse” within its rulings.14
Finally, and partly as a direct consequence of these terminological discrep-
ancies, until recently the scope and practical applicability of the doctrine of 
abuse and abusive practices were somewhat unclear. On the one hand, there 
was signiﬁ cant scepticism as to whether the references by the Court to abuse 
4. E.g. Van Binsbergen, note 1 supra, at para 13 and Case C-23/93, TV10 SA v. Commissa-
riaat voor de Media, [1994] ECR I-4795, para 21.
5. E.g. Case 115/78,   J. Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, [1979] ECR 399, 
para 50.
6. E.g. Case 229/83, Association des Centres distributeurs Édouard Leclerc and others v. 
SARL “Au blé vert” and others, [1985] ECR 1, para 27.
7. E.g. Case C-367/96, Alexandros Kefalas and Others v. Elliniko Dimosio (Greek State) and 
Organismos Oikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (OAE), [1998] ECR I-2843, para 
20.
8. E.g. Case C-441/93, Panagis Paﬁ tis and others v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados A.E. and 
others, [1996] ECR I-1363, para 68.
9. Although, the potential role played by divergent standards of legal translation at the Court 
should also be acknowledged here. The impact of translation matters upon law making at EU 
level, and in particular upon the case law of the Court, has been subject to increased scrutiny in 
recent years, see amongst others, Glezl, “Lost in Translation; EU Law and the Ofﬁ cial Lan-
guages – Problem of the Authentic Text”, Paper presented at a conference organized by the 
University of Cambridge’s Centre for European Legal Studies, entitled The Treaty of Rome – 50 
Years On!, Warsaw, 9–10 March 2007, available at <www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/events/warsaw_
conference.php>; and McAuliffe, “Translation at the Court of Justice of the European Commu-
nities” in Olsen and Stein (Eds.), Forensic Translation, (Palgrame MacMillan, 2007).
10. The expression “abuse or fraudulent conduct” was used for example in the Paletta II 
ruling, Case C-206/94, Brennet AG v. Vittorio Paletta, [1996] ECR I-2382, para 26.
11. See Hansen, “The development of the circumvention principle in the area of broadcast-
ing”, (1998) LIEI, 111–138.
12. See Ris and Pullen, “Advocate General reinforces the principle of country of origin 
control under the Television without Frontiers Directive”, (1996) ECLR, 453–461, at 456–457.
13. See Hörnle, “Country of origin regulation in cross-border media: One step beyond the 
freedom to provide services?”, (2005) ICLQ, 89–126, at 115 et seq.
14. Case C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas, [2000] ECR 
I-1569.
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did indeed amount to the development of a general principle of abuse of Com-
munity law.15 On the other, there were also important questions regarding the 
absence of criteria for determining the applicability of the doctrine, i.e. where 
a particular situation should be deemed to be abusive.16
This state of affairs has changed radically within the last few years, with 
abuse of law gaining signiﬁ cant prominence. This marked change has been 
attributed to various factors, including the increase in the volume of free move-
ment within the internal market and also the 2004 enlargement.17 However, it 
seems undeniable that two successive events have played a major role: ﬁ rst, 
the development by the ECJ of an abuse test in Emsland-Stärke in 2000;18 and 
second, the subsequent emergence of an intense debate as to whether the Court 
would apply this new test to the ﬁ eld of taxation.19 The rulings in Halifax and 
Cadbury Schweppes, the ﬁ rst applying the abuse test to VAT, the second to 
corporate taxation,20 represented a deﬁ nite turning point in terms of the atten-
tion dedicated by commentators and practitioners alike, to the newly desig-
nated “principle of prohibition of abuse of law”.21 And justiﬁ ably so: these two 
cases highlighted the broad scope of application of the Community’s abuse of 
law doctrine; conﬁ rmed the criteria for determining the existence of abuse (a 
slight alteration to the initial abuse test, as set out in Emsland-Stärke); and all 
of this whilst furthering the Court’s intervention in what is generally regarded 
as an extremely sensitive area for Member States, taxation.
These latest developments, however, give rise to signiﬁ cant questions, not 
only from a taxation perspective, but more generally from the perspective of 
the development of the EU legal system as a whole. In particular, it is unclear 
at present whether the case law of the Court in this area amounts to a fully 
ﬂ edged principle; and if so, what is the scope of that principle of prohibition 
15. See Kjellgren, “On the Border of Abuse – The Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Justice on circumvention, fraud and other misuses of Community Law”, (2000) EBLR, 179–
194; and Brown, op. cit. note 3 supra. For a discussion of this issue, see infra section 4.
16. The absence of criteria led some to undertake the difﬁ cult task of attempting to discern 
an objective pattern through in-depth analysis of the Court’s cases on abuse and abusive situa-
tions, see most notably Kjellgren, op. cit. note 15 supra.
17. See Engsig Sørensen, “Abuse of rights in Community law: A principle of substance or 
merely rhetoric?”, (2006) CML Rev., 423–459, at 423–424.
18. See note 14 supra.
19. See e.g. Harris, op. cit. supra note 3; and Farmer, “VAT Planning: Assessing the ‘Abuse 
of Rights’ Risk”, (27 May 2002) The Tax Journal, 15–17.
20. Cases C-255/02, Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent Development Services Ltd, County Wide 
Property Investments Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, [2006] ECR I-1609; and 
C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v. Commissioners of In-
land Revenue, [2006] ECR I-7995, respectively.
21. There is already a signiﬁ cant amount of literature on the topic post Halifax and Cadbury 
Schweppes, see infra section 3.
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of abuse, is it a principle of prohibition of abuse of Community law, or more 
broadly a Community principle of prohibition of abuse of law? Equally, can 
this principle of prohibition of abuse be characterized as a general principle of 
Community law? It has been said that no other issue in European law is today 
more important or better suited for intensiﬁ ed and thorough research than the 
development of common European legal principles.22 Yet, insofar as abuse of 
law is concerned, it is clear that discussion has been lacking.
This paper attempts to provide an answer to those questions through a com-
prehensive analysis of the Court’s case law to date on abuse and abusive prac-
tices in the context of the internal market.23 It starts by analysing the evolution 
of the Court’s approach to abuse until the recent tax rulings. It then looks at the 
recent tax judgments, questioning whether these represented the ﬁ nal conﬁ r-
mation of the existence of the abuse of law principle within the EU legal sys-
tem. It concludes with an analysis of the scope and characteristics of the prin-
ciple, inquiring in particular as to whether it constitutes a new general principle 
of Community law.
2. Evolution of the Court’s approach to abuse and abusive practices
The ﬁ rst reference by the ECJ to abuse and abusive practices appears to have 
been within the area of free movement of services, with the judgment in Van 
Binsbergen.24 Subsequently, over the last thirty years, the Court’s application 
of the concept has spread to various areas of the EU legal system, and signiﬁ -
cantly to all fundamental freedoms.25 Arguably, however, the approach adopt-
ed by the Court has neither been the same for all areas of the EU legal system, 
nor the same over time. In fact, an analysis of the relevant case law provides a 
sense of an evolving approach to abuse and abusive practices, progressively 
22. President of the Court of Justice, Rodriguez Iglesias, at the speech before the Danish 
Parliament, on 26 April 1999, cited in Nergelius, “General Principles of Community Law in the 
Future: Some Remarks on their Scope, Applicability and Legitimacy”, in Bernitz and Nergelius 
(Eds.), General Principles of European Community Law (Kluwer Law International, 2000), pp. 
223–234, at 223.
23. Due to length considerations, the discussion is broadly limited to internal market issues, 
although reference is made to areas of law which strictly speaking do not fall under the internal 
market banner, such as citizenship or the common agricultural policy. It will not include, how-
ever, examination of the use of the concept of “abuse of rights” in other areas of European law, 
such as human rights, contract law, international civil procedure or competition law.
24. See note 1 supra.
25. As the Court itself acknowledged in numerous cases, see e.g. the list of cases on abusive 
practices, by area, provided in Kefalas, note 7 supra, at para 20.
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developing a principle whose application appears to be heavily dependent on 
the subject matter at issue.
2.1. Free movement of services: the origins
Van Binsbergen is regarded as a landmark case within free movement of ser-
vices, not only because it introduced the doctrine of abuse of rights within the 
Community sphere, but equally, because it established the direct effect of Ar-
ticle 49 EC. The case concerned a Dutch lawyer chosen by Van Binsbergen to 
act as his legal representative in a case before a Dutch court. Although he was 
a Dutch national, while the case was still pending, Mr Van Binsbergen’s law-
yer moved to Belgium. Thus, as legal representation before Dutch courts was 
reserved to residents under Dutch law, Van Binsbergen’s lawyer lost his right 
to act as his representative. The Court considered that Dutch law restricting 
legal representation to residents constituted, in principle, a restriction on free 
movement of services. However, it added that such restrictions could be justi-
ﬁ ed – given the particular nature of the service provided – and could thus be 
regarded as compatible with Article 49 EC.26 Then, in a statement, which has 
been consistently cited by the Court in later rulings on abuse and abusive prac-
tices, it concluded:
“Likewise, a Member State cannot be denied the right to take measures to 
prevent the exercise by a person providing services whose activity is en-
tirely or principally directed towards its territory of the freedom guaran-
teed by article [49] for the purpose of avoiding the professional rules of 
conduct which would be applicable to him if he were established within 
that state; such a situation may be subject to judicial control under the 
provisions of the chapter relating to the right of establishment and not of 
that on the provision of services.”27
Although the statement in itself has been considered to have “relatively lim-
ited applicability”,28 in practice it constituted the basis for the Court’s initial 
approach to the so-called “u-turn”, or “circumvention” transactions. Broadly 
speaking, these are situations where either persons or goods move from one 
Member State to another, although the ﬁ nal destination of the transaction is the 
original Member State; the central focus is the exercise of a right conferred by 
Community law, the right to free movement, in order to circumvent the na-
tional law of a Member State. The Court’s initial approach to these, as re-
ﬂ ected in Van Binsbergen, as well as in later cases, was to deem it legitimate 
26. Van Binsbergen, note 1 supra, at para 12.
27. Id., at para 13.
28. See Kjellgren, note 15 supra, at 180.
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for Member States to apply legislation aimed at preventing this type of trans-
action. This statement implied that the Court regarded u-turn transactions, or 
circumvention cases, as falling within the scope of abuse of Community law, 
and in particular of the right to free movement.
Although this approach was applied to other areas of EU law, and in par-
ticular to other fundamental freedoms,29 special attention was given to the 
matter within the so-called broadcasting cases.
2.1.1. Broadcasting cases
In the early 1990s a number of cases were referred to the Court concerning 
circumvention transactions within the ﬁ eld of broadcasting,30 most notably 
Commission v. Belgium, Veronica and TV10.31 The cases focused on the inter-
pretation not only of the EC Treaty provisions on free movement of services, 
but also of the provisions of the Television Without Frontiers Directive, which 
establishes the legal framework for television broadcasting within the internal 
market.32 In all cases, the ECJ was essentially asked whether restrictions im-
posed by Member States on free movement of broadcasting services could be 
justiﬁ ed in light of the Court’s approach to abuse and abusive practices, as set 
out in Van Binsbergen. In all but one of these cases, the Court considered that 
the abuse doctrine, as set out in Van Binsbergen, did indeed apply. The signiﬁ -
cance of these rulings, and in particular of the application of the abuse doctrine 
to broadcasting, is considerable, and is highlighted by the fact that in 1997 an 
anti-abuse clause was included within the Television Without Frontiers Direc-
tive, with the speciﬁ cally stated aim of reﬂ ecting the Court’s case law on the 
matter.33
29. See Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany, [1986] ECR 3755; Case 39/86, Sylvie Lair v. 
Universität Hannover, [1988] ECR 3161; and Case C-61/89, Criminal proceedings against 
Marc Gaston Bouchoucha, [1990] ECR I-3551.
30. Hansen explains the rationale behind these cases: “In the area of broadcasting, circum-
vention of national rules is a well known phenomenon, not only because the national legislation, 
especially in regard to advertising, differs from Member State to Member State, but also because 
a broadcaster as opposed to other service providers is relatively free to establish himself where 
he prefers”, see note 11 supra, at 113.
31. See Case C-211/91, Commission v. Belgium, [1992] ECR I-6773; Case C-148/91, Ve-
reniging Veronica Omroep Organisatie v. Commissariaat voor de Media, [1993] ECR I-487; 
and TV10, note 4 supra respectively.
32. Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 Oct. 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pur-
suit of television broadcasting activities, O.J. 1989, L 298/23, as last amended by Directive 
2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 Dec. 2007, O.J. 2007, L 
332/27.
33. See Art. 2a and Recital 14 to the Preamble of Council Directive 89/552/EEC, as amend-
ed by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 1997, O.J. 
1997, L 202/60.
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In Commission v. Belgium the Belgian Government tried to invoke the 
abuse doctrine, as set out in Van Binsbergen, in order to justify national legis-
lation limiting access to the domestic cable TV network. Under Belgian law, 
broadcasters situated in other Member States were barred from access to that 
network, where the programmes were not broadcasted in one of the languages 
of the Member State in which the broadcaster was established. The Court reit-
erated its ruling in Van Binsbergen adding, however, that “it does not follow 
that it is permissible for a Member State to prohibit altogether the provision of 
certain services by operators established in other Member States, as that would 
be tantamount to abolishing the freedom to provide services.”34 The rationale 
for the decision in this case appears to have been that the Belgian “anti-abuse” 
legislation was in fact too broad, potentially applying to situations, which, in 
the view of the Court, might not amount to abuse. The same, however, did not 
apply, in its opinion, to the subsequent broadcasting cases.
In Veronica, a Dutch broadcasting company saw its broadcasting licence 
cancelled by the Dutch media regulator, following its decision to set up a com-
mercial transmitter in Luxembourg. The ECJ, again reiterating its ruling in 
Van Binsbergen, stated:
“By prohibiting national broadcasting organizations from helping to set up 
commercial radio and television companies abroad for the purpose of pro-
viding services there directed towards the Netherlands, the Netherlands 
legislation at issue has the speciﬁ c effect, with a view to safeguarding the 
exercise of the freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, of ensuring that those 
organizations cannot improperly evade the obligations deriving from the 
national legislation concerning the pluralistic and non-commercial content 
of programmes.”35
A similar approach was adopted by the Court, one year later, in TV10, a case 
which also involved Luxembourg and the Netherlands. TV10, a broadcasting 
company established in Luxembourg, had been denied access to the Nether-
lands cable network. The Dutch media regulator invoked, as reason for the 
refusal, the fact that TV10 had established itself in Luxembourg in order to 
“escape the Netherlands legislation” applicable to domestic broadcasters.36 
The Court ruled that:
“The Treaty provisions on freedom to provide services are to be inter-
preted as not precluding a Member State from treating as a domestic 
broadcaster a broadcasting body constituted under the law of another 
Member State and established in that State but whose activities are wholly 
34. Commission v. Belgium, note 31 supra, at para 12.
35. Veronica, note 31 supra, at para 13.
36. TV10, note 4 supra, at para 7.
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or principally directed towards the territory of the ﬁ rst Member State, if 
that broadcasting body was established there in order to enable it to avoid 
the rules which would be applicable to it if it were established within the 
ﬁ rst State.”37
What is particularly interesting about this case, is not so much the ruling itself, 
as this essentially reiterates the judgment in Veronica, but rather the Opinion 
of the Advocate General. In his Opinion, Advocate General Lenz provides a 
lengthy and detailed analysis on the issue of abuse, its scope and applicability, 
in particular in light of the Van Binsbergen line of case law. He essentially 
concludes that, although the statement in Van Binsbergen “raises doubts as to 
what legal consequences are to be linked with the avoidance of applicable 
rules”,38 in his view, the activity, even if abusive, should be regarded as falling 
within the scope of the free movement provisions. “[Thus] it is only within the 
framework of the freedom to provide services that the law of the country in 
which the services are provided can be applied under certain circumstances as 
a limitation of or an exception to the freedom as if the provider of services 
were established in that country.”39 Moreover, and as regards the criteria for 
the determination of existence of abuse, he states:
“In the ﬁ rst place, it should be considered on the basis of what facts a cir-
cumvention can be found to have taken place. Circumvention of a law or 
an abuse of law is regularly characterized by an intention to circumvent
or abuse, which is undoubtedly a subjective factor. Consequently, the in-
terpretation of the Van Binsbergen case law put forward by the Commis-
sion to the effect that there is an objective and a subjective test suggests 
itself. …
[However] I regard the employment of subjective criteria for assessing the 
legally relevant conduct of a legal person as problematic. Consequently, I 
consider that the avoidance of legal provisions by a legal person should be 
able to be determined using objective criteria.”40
Two aspects of the Opinion can potentially be regarded as constituting a pre-
cursor of, or a basis for, the development by the Court of the abuse doctrine in 
later rulings. First, the view that an activity, even if abusive, should be re-
garded as falling within the scope of the free movement provisions, with the 
abuse principle seen as “an exception” to those provisions, could arguably be 
regarded as the theoretical framework behind the Centros line of case law.41 As 
37. Id, at para 23.
38. Opinion of A.G. Lenz in TV10, ibid., at para 25.
39. Id., at para 33.
40. Id., at paras. 59 and 61.
41. See infra section 2.2.
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discussed below, the idea that circumvention of national rules can be legiti-
mate, and not abusive, rests on the assumption that, even when there is circum-
vention, the free movement provisions should still apply. The assessment as to 
whether there is abuse or not, should only be done a posteriori. Equally sig-
niﬁ cant is the reference in the Opinion to the need for the establishment of 
criteria for the determination of the existence of abuse, and in particular to the 
possible use of objective and/or subjective criteria. This could arguably be 
regarded as the origin of the so-called abuse test, set out by the ECJ some 
years later, in Emsland-Stärke.42
Thus, from the initial statement in Van Binsbergen, to the establishment of 
some of its theoretical foundations in the broadcasting cases, the free move-
ment of services’ jurisprudence can broadly be regarded as having initiated the 
process of creating a Community law principle of abuse, a process which was 
to be continued further within the context of other freedoms.
2.2. Freedom of establishment and company law: The development
Although references to abuse and abusive practices in the context of the free-
dom of establishment can be found within the Court’s rulings since the late 
1970s,43 only from the late 1990s onwards did these cases start to gain consid-
erable pre-eminence. This increased attention coincided with – and was prob-
ably partially caused by – the development of a different approach by the ECJ 
to national measures intended to ensure that freedom of establishment was not 
abused, particularly in the ﬁ eld of company law.
Initially the Court’s approach to freedom of establishment appeared to 
mimic that adopted in the ﬁ eld of free movement of services. In Daily Mail, a 
company incorporated in the United Kingdom applied for transfer its central 
management and control to the Netherlands, with the accepted principal aim 
of avoiding paying United Kingdom’s capital gains tax.44 Upon the Treasury’s 
refusal, Daily Mail initiated proceedings against it, claiming that the obliga-
tion under United Kingdom law to request an authorization for transfer of 
residence was contrary to Articles 43 and 48 EC. Without ever addressing di-
rectly the potential issue of abuse, or the fact that the purpose of the transfer 
was to avoid paying tax,45 the Court ruled:
42. See infra section 2.4 for an analysis of the abuse test, as set out by the Court in Emsland-
Stärke.
43. See Knoors, note 5 supra.
44. Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex 
parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc, [1988] ECR 5483.
45. A fact that has been classiﬁ ed as “curious” by Cunha and Cabral, see “’Presumed inno-
cent’: Companies and the exercise of the right of establishment under Community law”, (2000) 
EL Rev., 157–164, at 160.
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“It must therefore be held that the Treaty regards the differences in na-
tional legislation concerning the required connecting factor and the ques-
tion whether – and if so how – the registered ofﬁ ce or real head ofﬁ ce of a 
company incorporated under national law may be transferred from one 
Member State to another as problems which are not resolved by the rules 
concerning the right of establishment but must be dealt with by future 
legislation or conventions.
Under those circumstances, [Articles 43 and 48] of the Treaty cannot be 
interpreted as conferring on companies incorporated under the law of a 
Member State a right to transfer their central management and control and 
their central administration to another Member State while retaining their 
status as companies incorporated under the legislation of the ﬁ rst Member 
State.”46
Thus, the case was perceived by some Member States as giving carte blanche 
to the practice of using anti-abuse measures within the ﬁ eld of company law, 
which would otherwise have been regarded as restrictions on freedom of es-
tablishment.47 In that context, it is unsurprising that when, in 1999, the Centros 
ruling was delivered,48 it gave rise to signiﬁ cant controversy.49 Yet, the Court’s 
change of approach in Centros was not totally unpredictable.
For a few years, the Court had been signalling a different approach in lower 
proﬁ le rulings within the ﬁ eld of company law, most notably in the so-called 
“Greek challenge” cases, a series of case referred by the Greek courts concern-
ing alleged abuse of Second Company Law Directive’s provisions.50 In these 
cases the Court expressly accepted the right of national courts to apply domes-
tic anti-abuse of rights provisions and/or principles, even where those rights 
were granted by Community law. However, when read in conjunction, it is 
46. See note 44 supra, at paras. 23 and 24.
47. Although in Segers the Court had seemed to signal a different approach; in that case, it 
ruled that the refusal to accord a sickness beneﬁ t to a director of a company formed in accord-
ance with the law of another Member State could not be regarded as an appropriate measure to 
combat abusive practices within the ﬁ eld of company law, see Case 79/85, D. H. M. Segers v. 
Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank- en Verzekeringswezen, Groothandel en Vrije Be-
roepen, [1986] ECR 2375, at para 17.
48. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, [1999] ECR I-1459.
49. Craig and de Burca that the outcome of this case caused “considerable surprise”, see EU 
Law – Texts, Case and Materials, 4th ed. (OUP, 2007), at p. 809.
50. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 Dec. 1976 on coordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States 
of companies within the meaning of the second para of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the 
formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their cap-
ital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, O.J. 1977, L 26/1. See Paﬁ tis, note 8 
supra; Kefalas note 7 supra; and Case C-373/97, Dionysios Diamantis v. Elliniko Dimosio 
(Greek State) and Organismos Ikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (OAE), [2000] ECR 
I-1705.
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clear from the various rulings that, this right was deemed to be subject to cer-
tain conditions, namely: that the anti-abuse provisions do not detract from the 
full effect and uniform application of Community law;51 and that national anti-
abuse provisions do not alter the scope of the Community law provision in 
question, nor compromise the objectives pursued by it.52 Although Member 
States should perhaps have taken notice of the implicit limits imposed by the 
Court in those cases on the application of domestic anti-abuse rules and/or 
principles, in practice those judgments either failed to be noticed, or merely 
added to the general perception that restrictions on freedom of establishment 
where justiﬁ ed insofar as anti-abuse measures were concerned.
2.2.1. Centros and legitimate circumvention
From a purely company law perspective, Centros was regarded as a landmark 
decision from the outset.53 The case was widely perceived as an endorsement 
of the incorporation principle as a criterion for establishment of companies’ 
legal residence, signalling the beginning of the end for the application of the 
real seat principle within the EU.54 Nevertheless, from the perspective of the 
development of a Community principle of abuse by the ECJ, the case was no 
less signiﬁ cant, having helped delineate the concept of abuse for EU purpos-
es.
Broadly speaking, Centros was a circumvention case, i.e. it concerned a 
company, owned by Danish citizens, but incorporated in the United Kingdom, 
allegedly with the sole aim of avoiding the application of Danish rules on 
minimum capital. The company set up a branch in Denmark, but was refused 
registration with the local Chamber of Commerce on the basis that the branch 
would in reality be its primary establishment; as the company had never traded 
in the United Kingdom, this allegedly constituted an abuse of the freedom of 
establishment. Following proceedings at the Danish courts, the case was re-
51. See Paﬁ tis, note 8 supra, at para 68.
52. Kefalas, note 7 supra, at para 23; and Diamantis, note 50 supra, at para 34.
53. This is reﬂ ected in the attention given to the case by legal commentators. The Court’s 
own documents show over 130 notes and commentaries to the case, with a vast majority – over 
100 – written in the ﬁ rst two years, after the release of the ruling. See the following, at 546 to 
551: <curia.europa.eu/fr/coopju/apercu_reﬂ ets/common/recdoc/notes/Notes_89–04.pdf>.
54. Within the EU, the majority of Member States applied the real seat principle, including 
Germany, France and Austria; whilst a minority, including the UK and Ireland, applied the in-
corporation principle. For a discussion on the impact of the Centros ruling upon these principles 
see amongst others: Omar, “Centros, Überseering and beyond: a European recipe for corporate 
migration: Part 1”, (2004) International Company and Commercial Law Review, 398–407; 
Lowry, “Eliminating obstacles to freedom of establishment: The competitive edge of UK Com-
pany Law”, (2004) CLJ, 331–345; and Xanthaki, “Centros: is this really the end for the theory 
of the siège réel?”, (2001) Company Lawyer, 2–8.
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ferred to the ECJ, which was asked whether it was contrary to Articles 43 and 
48 EC for a Member State to refuse to register a branch under those circum-
stances.
The case law on circumvention situations within the ﬁ eld of services – such 
as the broadcasting cases, and Van Binsbergen itself – as well as previous 
cases within the ﬁ eld of establishment – such as Daily Mail – would seem to 
point in the direction that the Court would have regarded the situation in Cen-
tros as abusive and, consequently, the refusal of the Danish authorities as a 
justiﬁ able restriction on the freedom of establishment.55 However, as men-
tioned above, the Court had already been signalling – in particular in the 
“Greek challenge” cases – a more cautious attitude towards domestic provi-
sions aimed at curtailing abuse of right conferred by Community law. In Cen-
tros it took this new approach one step further: 
“It is true that according to the case law of the Court a Member State is 
entitled to take measures designed to prevent certain of its nationals from 
attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to 
circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from im-
properly or fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of Community 
law…
…
[However] the fact that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up 
a company chooses to form it in the Member State whose rules of com-
pany law seem to him the least restrictive and to set up branches in other 
Member States cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of estab-
lishment. The right to form a company in accordance with the law of a 
Member State and to set up branches in other Member States is inherent in 
the exercise, in a single market, of the freedom of establishment guaran-
teed by the Treaty.”56
Thus, the Court concluded that it was contrary to Articles 43 and 48 EC 
“for a Member State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in 
accordance with the law of another Member State, in which it has its reg-
istered ofﬁ ce but in which it conducts no business, where the branch is 
intended to enable the company in question to carry on its entire business 
in the State in which that branch is to be created, while avoiding the need 
to form a company there, thus evading application of the rules governing 
the formation of companies which, in that State, are more restrictive as 
regards the paying up of a minimum share capital.”57
55. This much was invoked by the Danish Government, see note 48 supra, at para 23.
56. Id., at paras. 24 and 27.
57. Id., at para 39.
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It has been pointed out that the circumstances in Centros were inherently dif-
ferent from those in other circumvention cases mentioned above, and that this 
might explain the different outcomes.58 Indeed, this could constitute a valid 
explanation, were it not for the post-Centros cases on freedom of establishment,59 
as well as those on free movement of workers, and even on citizenship is-
sues.60 In light of those, it seems much more reasonable to assume that, more 
than factual differences, what determined the different outcome in Centros 
was a fundamental shift in the Court’s legal approach to abuse. Under this new 
approach, the previous broad (and perhaps simplistic) conceptualization of 
abuse, under which all circumvention situations were regarded as abusive, was 
substituted for a narrower (and perhaps more sophisticated) conception of it, 
under which not all circumvention situations would be tantamount to an abuse 
of Community law. It is true that in Centros, the Court failed to establish deﬁ -
nite criteria for determining which situations were abusive, and which were 
not. However, it initiated the process of doing so, by re-conceptualizing abuse 
for EU purposes, and thus setting out the basis which would lead a year later 
to the establishment of the abuse test in Emsland-Stärke, and later on to its 
application in tax cases, such as Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes.
The obvious question that follows the above is why. Why was there such a 
shift in the case law? What prompted the ECJ to streamline its concept of 
abuse? Here one can only speculate. It is possible that the new approach mere-
ly reﬂ ected a better understanding of the abuse phenomenon and of different 
Member States’ approaches to the abuse of rights concept. In this case, the 
rationale for the shift would have had a purely legal nature. There might how-
ever be another explanation, which would suggest a much more policy-driven 
motivation. That is that the Court’s re-conceptualization of abuse is part of a 
wider interventionist approach as regards internal market issues, which could 
arguably constitute a further push towards European integration.
The logic of this argument works as follows: under Centros, so long as no 
harmonization rules apply within the internal market, persons and businesses 
alike are entitled to choose the most beneﬁ cial regulatory regime; thus, if reg-
58. See Engsig Sørensenn, op. cit. note 17 supra, at 444–447.
59. See namely Cases C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Bau-
management GmbH (NCC), [2002] ECR I-9919; and Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel 
en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd, [2003] ECR I-10155. In both rulings the Court 
reiterated its Centros approach to company law matters, thus increasing the disquiet amongst 
some Member States’ governments and company lawyers alike, over the end of the real seat 
principle. See in particular the comments of Omar, “Centros, Überseering and Beyond: a Euro-
pean Recipe for Corporate Migration: Part 2”, (2005) International Company and Commercial 
Law Review, 18–27; and Roth, “From Centros to Überseering: Free Movement of Companies, 
Private International Law, and Community Law”, (2003) ICLQ, 177–208.
60. See infra section 2.4.
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ulatory discrepancy continues to be the norm across the EU, regulatory com-
petition would increase, with potential economic beneﬁ ts for EU competitive-
ness as a whole;61 if, on the other hand, Member States are dissatisﬁ ed with the 
regulatory status quo, then further harmonization of company law constitutes 
the only alternative which is compatible with the internal market principles. 
Either way – increased competition or further harmonization – there are poten-
tial gains for the European integration cause.62 Seen in this context, the Court’s 
new approach to abuse adopted in Centros was probably, not only a calculated 
policy choice, but equally, a rational one.
2.3. Free movement of goods, Common Agricultural Policy and
 agricultural levies: abuse test
Cases regarding abuse and abusive practices in the context of the Common 
Agricultural Policy date back to the late 1970s.63 However, it was the ruling in 
Emsland-Stärke which had the most signiﬁ cant impact on the development of 
the Community law doctrine of abuse.64 The case concerned the interpretation 
of Regulation 2730/79.65 The factual circumstances of the case were relatively 
61. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the ruling in Centros has already been having 
the effect of increasing jurisdictional competition in EU company law: apparently not only have 
the number of start-ups from other Member States which are incorporated in the UK increased 
sharply since the 2000s; but equally, the minimum capital requirements have watered down in 
several other EU Member States, see Deakin, Legal Diversity and Regulatory Competition: 
Which Model for Europe?, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, Working 
Paper No. 323, March 2006, at 11. Whether regulatory competition in company law is the right 
way forward is debatable however. For a more detailed discussion of the so-called “Delaware 
effect”, also known as “race to the bottom”, whereby companies choose to register in a jurisdic-
tion with a light regime, see also e.g. Deakin, “Two types of regulatory competition: Competi-
tive federalism versus reﬂ exive harmonisation. A law and economics perspective on Centros”, 
(1999) CYELS, 231–260; and Barnard and Deakin, “Market access and regulatory competi-
tion”, in Barnard and Scott (Eds.) The Law of the Single European Market – Unpacking the 
Premises (Hart Publishing, 2002), pp. 197–224, in particular at 198–204.
62. Thus, the classic debate over whether to harmonize or increase regulatory competition 
within the EU, see e.g. Poiares Maduro, We the Court – The European Court of Justice and the 
European Economic Constitution (Hart Publishing, 1997), in particular at pp. 103–149; Reich, 
“Competition Between Legal Orders”, (1992) CML Rev., 861; Ehlermann, “Harmonisation ver-
sus Competition Between Rules”, (1995) EL Rev., 333; and Weatherill, “Why Harmonise?”, in 
Tridimas and Nebbia (Eds.), European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century: Rethinking the 
New Legal Order, Vol. 2, (Hart Publishing, 2004), pp. 11–32, in particular 11–19.
63. See Case 125/76, Peter Cremer v. Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung, 
[1977] ECR 1593, at para 21; and Case C-8/92, General Milk Products GmbH v. Hauptzollamt 
Hamburg-Jonas, [1993] ECR I-779, at para 21.
64. Emsland-Stärke, note 14 supra.
65. Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2730/79 of 29 Nov. 1979 on the application of the 
system of export refunds on agricultural products, O.J. 1979, L 317/1.
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straightforward: during 1987 Emsland-Stärke exported a potato-based product 
to Switzerland, for which it received export refund; however, subsequent in-
quiries conducted by the German customs authorities revealed that, immedi-
ately after their release for use in Switzerland, the products were transported 
back to Germany unaltered and by the same means of transport and released 
for use there; in light of this, in 1992 the German authorities reclaimed from 
Emsland-Stärke what they perceived as unduly granted refund. The question 
for the Court was essentially whether in these circumstances the Regulation 
should be interpreted as precluding Emsland-Stärke’s right to export refund.
At the hearing, Emsland-Stärke argued that a general principle of abuse of 
rights did not constitute a clear and unambiguous legal basis for the claim of 
repayment of the export refund.66 The Commission argued, however, that 
whilst Regulation 2730/79 did not constitute a legal basis for demanding re-
payment of export refunds, consideration should be given to Article 4(3) of 
Regulation 2988/95 on the protection of the European Communities’ ﬁ nancial 
interests, according to which “[a]cts which are established to have as their 
purpose the obtaining of an advantage contrary to the objectives of the Com-
munity law applicable in the case by artiﬁ cially creating the conditions re-
quired for obtaining that advantage shall result, as the case shall be, either in 
failure to obtain the advantage or in its withdrawal.”67
This provision was, according to the Commission, simply the expression of 
a general principle of law in force within the Community legal order. Although, 
it acknowledged that the Court had not expressly recognized it as a general 
principle of Community law, the Commission argued that a general legal prin-
ciple of abuse of rights existed in almost all the Member States and had, in 
practice, already been applied in the case law of the ECJ.68
The Court agreed with the Commission, albeit without making reference to 
abuse as a “general principle of Community law”. It started by pointing out 
that it was clear from its previous jurisprudence, and in particular Cremer and 
General Milk Products, not only that the scope of Community Regulations 
could not be extended to cover abuses on the part of a trader, but equally that, 
where importation and re-exportation operations were not realized as bona 
ﬁ de commercial transactions, the granting of monetary compensatory amounts 
might be precluded.69 It then went on to set out an abuse test:
66. Emsland-Stärke, note 14 supra, at para 24.
67. Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No. 2988/95 of 18 Dec. 1995 on the protection of the 
European Communities ﬁ nancial interests, O.J. 1995, L 312/1.
68. See note 14 supra, at paras. 36–38.
69. Id. at para 51.
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“A ﬁ nding of an abuse requires, ﬁ rst, a combination of objective circum-
stances in which, despite formal observance of the conditions laid down 
by the Community rules, the purpose of those rules has not been 
achieved.
It requires, second, a subjective element consisting in the intention to ob-
tain an advantage from the Community rules by creating artiﬁ cially the 
conditions laid down for obtaining it. The existence of that subjective ele-
ment can be established, inter alia, by evidence of collusion between the 
Community exporter receiving the refunds and the importer of the goods 
in the non-member country.
It is for the national court to establish the existence of those two elements, 
evidence of which must be adduced in accordance with the rules of na-
tional law, provided that the effectiveness of Community law is not there-
by undermined.”70
As already noted above, the signiﬁ cance of the ruling in Emsland-Stärke lies 
in the fact that, for the ﬁ rst time, the Court provided criteria for determining 
the existence of abuse for the purposes of Community law.71 It is true that there 
had already been implicit references to an abuse test in previous case law of 
the Court;72 however, never until Emsland-Stärke had the Court expressly en-
dorsed such test. For this reason, and despite its relatively obscure subject 
matter, the case gave rise to signiﬁ cant debate.
Two aspects of the ruling were particularly controversial: ﬁ rst the inclusion 
of a subjective element within the abuse test; second, the implications of this 
novel abuse test for other areas of Community law. The controversy surround-
ing the inclusion of the subjective element was connected to the fact that prior 
to Emsland-Stärke some, including advocates general, had expressed reserva-
tions about the usefulness of that element.73 The debate over the implications 
of the new abuse test for other areas of Community law, on the other hand, was 
an issue which was directly associated with the Court’s rationale in Emsland-
Stärke, i.e. whether the abuse test could be extended to other areas of Com-
munity law, depended on the reason behind the establishment of the test by the 
ECJ in the ﬁ rst place. Although the ruling provides no express help in this re-
gard, it was assumed by many immediately after the judgment that the fact that 
agricultural levies constituted a Community’s own resource had played a ma-
70. Id. at paras. 52 to 54.
71. See along the same lines Weber, “Abuse of Law – European Court of Justice, 14 Decem-
ber 2000 – Case C-110/99, Emsland-Stärke”, (2004) LIEI, 43–55, at 51.
72. See in particular Opinion of A.G. Lenz in TV10, note 4 supra.
73. See review provided by Weber, note 71 supra, at 51–52. It is interesting to note that in 
Halifax the Court has introduced amendments to the test, precisely in relation to its subjective 
element, see infra section 3.1.
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jor role.74 On this basis it was argued by some Member States’ tax authorities 
that, as VAT was also part of the Community’s own resources,75 the abuse test 
should apply within the ﬁ eld of that tax.76
Thus, it was in this manner that the existence, or not, of an EC principle of 
abuse, became ﬁ rmly a tax matter. One that has been much debated over the 
last seven years, and which shows no signs of relenting.77
2.4. Free movement of workers and citizenship: The Exception?
At the same time that the debate surrounding the application of the new abuse 
test to tax law matters was beginning to emerge, questions were being raised 
as regards the Court’s reluctance to apply the case law on the doctrine of abuse 
to other areas of Community law, namely free movement of workers and citi-
zenship. As with the Common Agricultural Policy, the Court had already ruled 
on abuse and abusive practices in the context of free movement of workers 
before.78 However, it was only more recently, and namely since the ruling in 
Centros, that its approach became clearer and thus more questionable, in par-
ticular in light of the ruling in Emsland-Stärke.
In 2003 the Court issued two rulings which clearly hinted at a strict ap-
proach to the concept of abuse in the context of free movement of workers: 
Ninni-Orasche and Akrich. In Ninni-Orasche, an Italian citizen contested the 
refusal by the Austrian authorities to grant her funding for studying at an Aus-
74. Harris, for example, argued that “the Commission intervened in this reference to the ECJ 
speciﬁ cally to protect the Communities’ own resources”, op. cit. supra note 3, at 141.
75. The principal piece of legislation in this regard is Council Decision 2000/597/EC, 
Euratom of 29 Sept. 2000 on the system of the European Communities’ own resources, O.J. 
2000, L 253/42. There is, however, a substantial amount of legislation in this area, see list pro-
vided in de la Feria, A Handbook of EU VAT Legislation, Vol. II, (Kluwer Law International, 
2004), at table V.A.1.
76. In 2003, Harris commented that “in recent cases before United Kingdom VAT tribunals, 
Customs and Excise have made some reliance on the case of Emsland-Stärke in support of an 
assertion that abus de droit is a general principle of Community law, and can therefore be ap-
plied universally in matters of VAT avoidance within the Member States”, op. cit. supra note 3 
at 137. See also Ladds and Chowdry, “Debenhams Retail Plc v. Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise”, (2004) BTR, 26–36, at 32.
77. As Terra and Kajus commented in 2004, speciﬁ cally as regards VAT, “it seems that the 
discussion regarding legal principles (and VAT) in the near future will focus on the applicability 
of the abuse of rights doctrine”, in A Guide to the European VAT Directives, Volume I, (IBFD, 
2004), at p. 42. See infra section 3 for an analysis of the abuse debate in the context of taxa-
tion.
78. See Case 53/81, D.M. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [1982] ECR 1035, at para 21; 
Lair, note 29 supra, at para 43; Case C-370/90, The Queen v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal et 
Surinder Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for Home Department, [1992] ECR I-4265, at para 
24; and C-206/94, Brennet AG v. Vittorio Paletta, [1996] ECR I-2357, at paras. 24 and 25.
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trian university.79 At issue was the interpretation of the free movement of 
workers’ provisions, as Ms. Ninni-Orasche had worked part-time in Austria 
for a short period, before embarking on her undergraduate studies. Amongst 
other aspects, the national court asked the ECJ whether the student’s applica-
tion for funding, should be regarded as abusive. The Court started by empha-
sizing that according to Lair “migrant workers are guaranteed certain rights 
linked to the status as a worker even when they are no longer in an employ-
ment relationship”; however, this “cannot give rise to a situation whereby a 
national of a Member State may enter another Member State for the sole pur-
pose of enjoying, after a very short period of occupational activity, the beneﬁ t 
of the student assistance system in that State.” Such an abuse, the Court states, 
is not covered by the Community provisions in question.80 Ultimately, the ECJ 
considered that it was for the national court to determine whether the condi-
tions established in Lair were met, and namely whether Ms. Ninni-Orasche’s 
request was abusive. Notwithstanding this, the Court did emphasize that, as 
long as the employment activity performed was not “purely marginal and an-
cillary”, a national of a Member State working as a temporary worker in an-
other Member State was entitled to the protection granted by the free move-
ment of workers’ provisions. Implicit in the Court’s ruling therefore is a nar-
rowed view of what falls within the concept of abuse. This approach was made 
even clearer in Akrich.
The case in Akrich concerned the right of a Moroccan national to enter and 
remain in the United Kingdom.81 After many years of attempting to reside 
there, Mr Akrich married a British citizen in 1996. As soon as the couple had 
lived in Ireland for six months, Mr Akrich applied for residence in the United 
Kingdom. The application was refused however on the basis that Mr and Mrs 
Akrich had moved to Ireland for the express purpose of subsequently exercis-
ing Community rights in order to be able to lawfully return to the United 
Kingdom. The case was referred to the ECJ, which was essentially asked 
whether in these circumstances, the couple was entitled to reside in the United 
Kingdom under the free movement of workers provisions, and in particular in 
light of the Court’s previous case law.
In his Opinion, Advocate General Geelhoed argued for the application of 
the abuse test, as set out in Emsland-Stärke.82 After highlighting the difﬁ culties 
79. Case C-413/01, Franca Ninni-Orasche v. Bundesminister für Wissenschaft, Verkehr und 
Kunst, [2003] ECR I-13187.
80. Id., at paras. 34 and 36.
81. Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Hacene Akrich, [2003] 
ECR I-9607.
82. Id., Opinion of the A.G., at para 96.
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of applying this test to a particular case, the Advocate General, went on to 
conclude:
“The installation of a worker in another Member State in order to beneﬁ t 
from a more favourable legal system is by its nature not a misuse of Com-
munity law.
That being said, the question arises as to whether the same is true of the 
return of a Community worker to his own Member State …
 In my view it is established that return to one’s own Member State un-
der the conditions laid down in Community law is inherent in the freedom 
of movement of persons. By its very nature there is no abuse of Commu-
nity law where the persons concerned on such return rely on the rights 
conferred on them by Community law. 
 I conclude that in the situation arising in the main proceedings there can 
be no question of a misuse of Community law.”83
Albeit essentially arriving at the same conclusion, the ECJ did not follow the 
Advocate General’s line of argument.84 In particular, it is interesting to note 
the Court’s choice not to apply the abuse test. In fact, on the issue of whether 
the conduct in question could be regarded as abusive, the Court merely stated 
the following:85
“It should be mentioned that the motives which may have prompted a 
worker of a Member State to seek employment in another Member State 
are of no account as regards his right to enter and reside in the territory of 
the latter State provided that he there pursues or wishes to pursue an effec-
tive and genuine activity …
 Nor are such motives relevant in assessing the legal situation of the 
couple at the time of their return to the Member State of which the worker 
is a national. Such conduct cannot constitute an abuse … even if the spouse 
did not, at the time when the couple installed itself in another Member 
State, have a right to remain in the Member State of which the worker is a 
national.
 Conversely, there would be an abuse if the facilities afforded by Com-
munity law in favour of migrant workers and their spouses were invoked 
in the context of marriages of convenience entered into in order to circum-
vent the provisions relating to entry and residence of nationals of non-
Member States.”86
83. Id., at paras. 181–184.
84. For a critical analysis of the differences between the Opinion of the A.G. and the Court’s 
judgment, see annotation by Spaventa, (2005) CML Rev., 225–239.
85. It has been suggested that the brevity of the Court’s ruling indicates that the Court found 
this a difﬁ cult case, see White, “Conﬂ icting competences: free movement rules and immigration 
laws”, (2004) EL Rev., 385–396, at 389.
86. Akrich, supra note 81, at paras. 55 to 57. The Court concluded that Mr Akrich could not 
rely on EC law for protection, on the basis that he had not been a lawful resident of a Member 
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It has been argued that “the dismissal of allegations of abuse of rights” in both 
Ninni-Orasche and Akrich, highlights the Court’s view that there is no such 
thing as “abusively creating” the situation whereby someone becomes a work-
er for the purposes of EU law.87 In fact, it did not exclude the possible exis-
tence of abuse in the context of free movement of workers, in practice the 
Court signiﬁ cantly narrowed the doctrine’s scope of application. Yet, the most 
controversial rulings arose within the ﬁ eld of citizenship.
2.4.1. Citizenship cases
The development of case law within the area of EU citizenship by the Court of 
Justice is a relatively recent phenomenon. It is true that even prior to the intro-
duction of the citizenship provisions by the Maastricht Treaty, there were a 
few rulings which are said that have had a “citizenship component”;88 how-
ever, those provisions were only given a full central role by the Court after its 
ruling in Grzelczyk, in 2001.89 Yet, despite the infancy of the case law in this 
area, there have been already three citizenship cases in recent years, where the 
issue of abuse played – or perhaps, should have played – a signiﬁ cant part.
The ﬁ rst of these cases was Chen, which concerned the refusal by the Unit-
ed Kingdom authorities to grant Mrs Chen, a Chinese citizen, and her daughter 
Catherine, an Irish citizen, a permanent residence permit.90 The factual cir-
cumstances of the case were relatively straightforward. Mr and Mrs Chen were 
Chinese citizens, who, for business reasons, travelled frequently to the United 
Kingdom. The couple had a child, born in China in 1998, and wished to have 
a second, but they had come across difﬁ culties due to the birth control policy 
in that country. In that context, Mrs Chen, who was six months pregnant, de-
cided to travel to the United Kingdom and temporarily establish herself in 
Northern Ireland. The child, Catherine, was born in Belfast in 2000, and pur-
State, see para 58. The so-called “lawful residence” criterion has again been applied by the 
Court in the recent Jia ruling, Case C-1/05, Yunying Jia v. Migrationsverket, [2007] ECR I-1; 
although, according to some commentators, not with great clarity, see annotation by Elsmore 
and Starup, (2007) CML Rev., 787–801. As opposed to Akrich, however, in Jia “it is not alleged 
that the family member in question was … seeking to evade national immigration legislation 
illicitly”, see judgment at para 31.
87. See Craig and de Burca, op. cit. note 49 supra, at 779.
88. See Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU – The Four Freedoms, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2007), 
at p. 415.
89. Case C-184/99, Rudy Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-
Neuve, [2001] ECR I-6193, at para 31. As Arnull comments, initially the Court’s approach to the 
effect of the citizenship provisions was “rather cautious”, see The European Union and its Court 
of Justice, 2nd ed. (OUP, 2006), at p. 511.
90. Case C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette Chen v. Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, [2004] ECR I-9925.
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suant to Irish nationality legislation, was issued with an Irish passport. It was 
accepted from the outset that Mrs Chen had taken up residence on the island 
of Ireland in order to enable the child she was expecting to acquire Irish na-
tionality and, consequently, to allow herself and her daughter to acquire the 
right to reside in the United Kingdom. Having applied for residence permis-
sion in the United Kingdom, Catherine and her mother saw this application 
declined on the basis that the situation, whereby Catherine obtained Irish citi-
zenship, was abusive.
The Court, following the Opinion of the Advocate General,91 brieﬂ y dis-
missed the existence of abuse, stating:
“It is true that Mrs Chen admits that the purpose of her stay in the United 
Kingdom was to create a situation in which the child she was expecting 
would be able to acquire the nationality of another Member State in order 
thereafter to secure for her child and for herself a long-term right to reside 
in the United Kingdom.
 Nevertheless, under international law, it is for each Member State, hav-
ing due regard to Community law, to lay down the conditions for the ac-
quisition and loss of nationality …
 None of the parties that submitted observations to the Court has ques-
tioned either the legality, or the fact, of Catherine’s acquisition of Irish 
nationality. 
 Moreover, it is not permissible for a Member State to restrict the effects 
of the grant of the nationality of another Member State by imposing an 
additional condition for recognition of that nationality with a view to the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms provided for in the Treaty ….
 However, that would be precisely what would happen if the United 
Kingdom were entitled to refuse nationals of other Member States, such as 
Catherine, the beneﬁ t of a fundamental freedom upheld by Community 
law merely because their nationality of a Member State was in fact ac-
quired solely in order to secure a right of residence under Community law 
for a national of a non-member country.”92
In Collins the possibility of abuse was not even discussed by the Court.93 The 
case concerned the refusal by the United Kingdom authorities to grant Mr Col-
lins, a citizen with dual nationality, American and Irish, the right to obtain a 
job seeker’s allowance. Mr Collins was an American citizen, who on various 
occasions from 1979 to 1981 had resided in the United Kingdom. During one 
of his stays there he had applied and obtained Irish nationality. During the fol-
91. See in particular paras. 108–129 of the Opinion in Chen.
92. Id., at paras 36–40.
93. Case C-138/02, Brian Francis Collins v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
[2004] ECR I-2703.
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lowing years he lived mostly in the United States of America, but also in Afri-
can countries. In 1998, Mr Collins arrived in the United Kingdom with the 
intention of ﬁ nding work. A few days after his arrival he applied for a job 
seeker’s allowance, which was refused by the competent authorities on the 
basis that he was not habitually resident in the United Kingdom.
At the hearing it was established that Mr Collins had never “lived nor 
worked in Ireland”, and that he only had visited Ireland “on three occasions for 
periods of, at most, 10 days”. Yet, Advocate General Colomer regarded these 
circumstances as “irrelevant”,94 with the ECJ making no reference to them. 
That the conduct could be regarded as abusive did not even seem to constitute 
a consideration for either the Court, or the Advocate General.95
The latest development within the ﬁ eld of EU citizenship, which gave rise 
to abuse considerations, was Commission v. Austria.96 In this case, the Com-
mission was seeking a declaration from the ECJ that Austria was in breach its 
obligations under Articles 17 and 18 of the EC Treaty, by failing to take the 
necessary measures to ensure that holders of secondary education diplomas 
awarded in other Member States can gain access to higher and university edu-
cation organized by it under the same conditions as holders of secondary edu-
cation diplomas awarded in that country. In its submissions to the Court, Aus-
tria argued that its legislation was justiﬁ able on the basis that it constituted a 
measure intended on preventing abuse of Community law.97 The Court dis-
agreed.
Although implicitly acknowledging that prevention of abuse of Community 
law can indeed constitute an acceptable justiﬁ cation for certain measures re-
stricting EC law provisions, the Court considered that: “In this case, it need 
merely be observed that the possibility for a student from the European Union, 
who has obtained his secondary education diploma in a Member State other 
than Austria, to gain access to Austrian higher or university education under 
the same conditions as holders of diplomas awarded in Austria constitutes the 
very essence of the principle of freedom of movement for students guaranteed 
by the Treaty, and cannot therefore of itself constitute an abuse of that 
right.”98
94. Id., Opinion of the A.G., at para 23 and footnote 16.
95. The same is true of commentators, see annotation by Oosterom-Staples, (2005) CML 
Rev., 205–223; and Meulman and de Waele, “Funding the Life of Brian: Jobseekers, Welfare 
Shopping and the Frontiers of European Citizenship”, (2004) LIEI, 275–288. However, Meul-
man and de Waele do highlight the fact that at the centre of the ruling is an issue of welfare 
shopping and beneﬁ t tourism, see in particular 287–288.
96. Case C-147/03, Commission v. Republic of Austria, [2005] ECR I-5969.
97. Id., at paras 54 and 55.
98. Id., at para 70. See Annotation by Rieder, (2006) CML Rev., 1711–1726, at 1715.
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The Court’s dismissal of existence of abuse in the context of all the above 
citizenship cases, as well as in the most recent workers cases, can be seen as a 
mere consolidation of previous jurisprudence, namely on freedom of estab-
lishment. However, it can also be said that it goes further than any previous 
case law by ruling out the existence of abuse in cases, such as the ones on 
citizenship, which could have reasonably been argued to reﬂ ect more extreme 
situations of abuse. In fact, if the circumstances in Commission v. Austria – as 
well as the Court’s response in that case – mirror to a large extent those in 
Centros, the same could not be said of the circumstances in Collins, and even 
less so, of those in Chen. Indeed, there seems to be an artiﬁ cial element in both 
these latter cases, which arguably merited, at the very least, a closer examina-
tion by the Court.99 In particular, application of the abuse test, as set out by the 
Court in Emsland-Stärke, to both cases, could have resulted in a different out-
come.
Once again we must pose the question, why? Namely, why did the Court 
refrain from applying the Emsland-Stärke test to these cases, and why has it 
consistently dismissed the existence of abuse in cases concerning free move-
ment of persons, often without providing a full explanation of its reasoning?100 
Indeed, the case law appears to suggest a divergence of approach by the ECJ 
to abuse in cases concerning purely commercial situations, namely those in-
volving legal persons, from those involving natural persons.101 It is, of course, 
impossible to ascertain with certainty what is the rationale for this distinct ap-
proach. However, at least part of the answer might reside in the relatively low 
proﬁ le that persons have enjoyed within the case law of the Court for many 
years. There is undoubtedly a sense that the ECJ is attempting to strike a bal-
ance between its wish to push for integration, by giving EU citizens more ex-
tensive rights102 – such as in Ninni-Orasche, Akrich and Collins – and the need 
to take into account the politically sensitive nature of free movement of per-
99. The Court’s refusal in Chen to consider the abuse argument in more detail has been 
criticized by Carlier, who comments: “In Chen, the question of abuse of law was maybe more 
important than that of the purely internal situation. Was there not a kind of fraudulent use of 
European law which, fraus omnia corrumpit, would lead to dismissing its effects?”, in annota-
tion, (2005) CML Rev. 1121–1131, at 1127–1128.
100. This has led Hofstotter to assert, in the wake of the Chen ruling, that “clearly, the fre-
quently tested but ineffective argument of an abuse of rights cannot bite”, in (2005) EL Rev., 
548–558, at 558.
101. See Snell, who comments more generally that “a common theme is emerging from the 
case law. The Court has consistently favoured the movement of Union citizens over other forms 
of free movement”, in “And then there were two: Products and citizens in Community law”, in 
Tridimas and Nebbia, op. cit. note 62 supra, pp. 49–72, at 62.
102. See Hofstotter, op. cit. note 100 supra, at 548.
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sons – as in Chen.103 One might have thought that the same balance was re-
quired as regards some commercial law areas, namely taxation. Yet, insofar as 
taxation is concerned, the Court has not shied away from adopting a more in-
terventionist approach, applying the EC law concept of abuse to a growing 
range of circumstances.
3. Taxation: The conﬁ rmation of a new general principle of
 Community law?
Before Emsland-Stärke, it would have been almost impossible to foresee the 
impact that a decision on agricultural levies would have on EU tax law and 
policy. This it is not to say that the application of the Court of Justice’s case 
law on abuse to tax law matters had not been the focus of debate beforehand; 
it had, in particular in the wake of the Centros ruling.104 However, it is undeni-
able that the decision in Emsland-Stärke represented a turning point in this 
regard. The discussion was initially centred on VAT,105 and only later did it 
move to direct taxation.
3.1. Indirect taxation and Halifax
Soon after the ruling in Emsland-Stärke, the ﬁ rst references concerning the 
applicability of the new abuse test to VAT cases started arriving to the ECJ.106 
Amongst the ﬁ rst of these cases was Halifax, a case referred in 2002 by the 
United Kingdom courts, which would become a landmark ruling, not only 
from a tax perspective, but arguably for the development of a general Com-
munity principle of prohibition of abuse.107 However, largely due to its contro-
versial nature, and potential implications, the case was not decided until 
103. See Kunoy, “A Union of National Citizens: The origins of the Court’s lack of Avant-
Gardisme in the Chen case”, (2006) CML Rev., 179–190.
104. See Saldanha Sanches, “Normas Anti-Abuso, Jurisprudência Comunitária e Direito 
Português: As Provisões no Balanço Fiscal”, Conferência sobre Fiscalidade International, Uni-
versidade Nova de Lisboa, 12–13 March 2002; Werlauff, “The consequences of the Centros 
decision: Ends and means in the protection of public interests”, (2000) European Taxation, 
542–545; and Eicker, “In the Centros Case the ECJ delivered a decision with far-reaching impli-
cations for company law and tax law”, (1999) Intertax, 391–392.
105. For the reasons explained supra, see section 2.3.
106. See Ridsdale, “Abuse of rights, ﬁ scal neutrality and VAT”, (2005) EC Tax Review, 
82–94.
107. See note 20 supra. For an analysis of the proceedings in the United Kingdom courts, 
which preceded the reference to the Court of Justice, see Pincher, “What is avoidance”, (2002) 
BTR, 9–20.
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2006.108 In the intervening period, the Court decided on various other VAT 
cases, where the issue of abuse arose.109
3.1.1. The road to Halifax
RAL was the ﬁ rst in a series of cases regarding the use of so-called aggressive 
VAT planning schemes decided in 2005.110 The case concerned the determina-
tion of the place of supply of services, where the supplier, the RAL Group, had 
– through a restructuring scheme – located its place of business outside the 
Community for the sole or main purpose of avoiding liability to VAT. The 
United Kingdom tax authorities challenged the scheme on two bases: the in-
terpretation of Articles 43 to 59 of the Common VAT System Directive (here-
after: “CVSD”),111 and alternatively the fact that the structure set up by the 
RAL Group amounted to an abuse of rights.
Following proceedings in the UK courts, the case was referred to the ECJ, 
which was essentially asked: ﬁ rst, to interpret the rules regarding place of sup-
ply of services, in Articles 43 to 59 of the CVSD; and secondly, whether there 
was a principle of abuse of rights in Community law applicable in the ﬁ eld of 
VAT. The Court, following the Opinion of its Advocate General, skilfully 
avoided answering the second question by adopting a controversial interpreta-
tion of the VAT place of supply of services rules.112
Some months later, the Court issued its decision in Joined Cases Gemeente 
Leusden and Holin Groep.113 The cases concerned the introduction of anti-
avoidance law in the Netherlands, which included a rule abolishing the right to 
opt for taxation of lettings of immovable property where certain conditions 
were met. Both Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep had entered into leasing 
108. In fact, several procedural facts seemed to point towards a certain hesitation by the 
Court as regards this case: ﬁ rst, the delivery of the A.G.’s Opinion was delayed by two months 
(initially due in February 2005, it was in fact only released in April 2005); second, Halifax and 
BUPA were the last VAT-related cases (by several months) entering the Court’s register in 2002 
to be ruled upon; and, third, the case was heard at the Court’s Grand Chamber, a rarity in itself.
109. For a joint analysis of all these rulings, see de la Feria, “The European Court of Justice’s 
solution to aggressive VAT planning – further towards legal uncertainty?” (2006) EC Tax Re-
view, 27–35.
110. Case C-452/03, Chancery Division RAL (Channel Islands) Ltd and Others v. Commis-
sioners of Customs and Excise, [2005] ECR I-3947.
111. Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 Nov. 2006 on the common system of value added 
tax, O.J. 2006, L 347/1. 
112. The ruling came as a surprise, mostly in light of the Court’s previous case law on place 
of supply of services’ provisions, see for a comprehensive analysis of the decision and its impli-
cations, de la Feria, “ ‘Game Over’ for aggressive VAT planning?: RAL v. Commissioners of 
Customs & Excise”, (2005) BTR, 394–401.
113. Joined Cases C-487/01 & C-7/02, Gemeente Leusden v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën 
and Holin Groep BV cs v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, [2005] ECR I-5337.
COLA2008030.indd   419 3/19/2008   1:14:27 PM
420  De la Feria CML Rev. 2008 
agreements prior to the new legislation, and had opted to waive the exemption 
applicable to those services. Following the entry into force of the new law, the 
Dutch tax authorities took the view that an adjustment to the VAT deducted 
was required on the basis that Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep were no 
longer entitled to waive the exemption in respect of those lettings. The Court 
of Justice was asked whether the CVSD provisions, or the principles of legiti-
mate expectations and legal certainty, precluded such an adjustment.
Although the case did not directly involve abuse issues, the ruling does 
provide an interesting insight into the Court’s approach to abusive practices in 
the context of tax law. The Court began by emphasizing that “preventing pos-
sible tax avoidance and abuse is an objective recognized and encouraged by 
the Sixth Directive”.114 It then goes on to state: “As regards tax avoidance, al-
though, under the law of a Member State, a taxpayer cannot be censured for 
taking advantage of a provision or a lacuna in the legislation which, without 
constituting abuse, has allowed him to pay less tax, the repeal of legislation 
from which a person liable to VAT has derived an advantage cannot, as such, 
breach a legitimate expectation based on Community law”.115
In December 2005, it was the turn of Centralan.116 The case concerned a 
series of transactions entered into by the University of Central Lancashire al-
legedly with the exclusive, or main, purpose of maximizing the recovery of 
input VAT incurred on the construction costs of one of its buildings. Following 
proceedings in the United Kingdom courts between Centralan, one of the Uni-
versity-owned companies involved in the transactions, and the United King-
dom tax authorities, the case was referred to the Court of Justice. The ques-
tions referred solely concerned the interpretation of CVSD provisions; how-
ever, in its written observations, the Commission suggested that, in light of 
pending proceedings, including Halifax, the applicability of the principle of 
abuse of rights to this case should be considered.
Once again, as it had done in RAL, the Court avoided answering the ques-
tion on the applicability of the abuse principle, by adopting a teleological in-
terpretation of the CVSD provisions: “Finally, given that, in circumstances 
such as those of the main proceedings, in the event that the national court 
comes to the conclusion mentioned in paragraph 64 above, … it is not appro-
114. Id. at para 76. The Court adds: “it would be contrary to that objective to prohibit a 
Member State to require immediate application of its law withdrawing the right to opt for taxa-
tion of certain lettings of immovable property entailing an obligation to adjust deductions made, 
where the State has become aware that the right to option was being used as part of tax avoid-
ance schemes”, at para 77.
115. Id. at para 79.
116. Case C-63/04, Centralan Property Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, [2005] 
ECR I-11087.
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priate to consider the possible application of the principle of abuse of rights in 
such circumstances.”117
Although arriving at the same conclusion, Advocate General Kokott did 
provide further guidance on the applicability of the concept of abuse in the 
context of VAT. While acknowledging the existence of artiﬁ cial transactions, 
she ultimately deemed it superﬂ uous to analyse whether the principle of abuse 
of rights applied. This is because, in her view, to adopt a purposive interpreta-
tion of CVSD provisions would “preclude these artiﬁ cial transactions from 
giving rise to a tax exemption which would run counter to the objectives of the 
directive and would have to be remedied by course to unwritten principles 
such as the prohibition on the abuse of rights”.118 The most interesting aspect 
of the Advocate General’s Opinion in Centralan was, therefore, not so much 
the solution advocated, but rather the rationale behind it. In fact several sig-
niﬁ cant points emerge from the Opinion, namely: an acknowledgment of the 
existence of “artiﬁ cial transactions”, i.e. aggressive tax planning, as a distinct 
phenomenon; an acceptance of the need and desirability of combating this 
phenomenon, i.e. the assumption of applicability of the principle of abuse of 
rights to the VAT area; and ﬁ nally, recognition of the principle of abuse of 
rights as a potential method to combat this phenomenon.
It is interesting to note that although the Court’s policy in relation to the ap-
plicability of the previous case law on abuse to the VAT ﬁ eld would only be-
come clearer with Halifax, the main elements of that policy were already pres-
ent in Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep and in Centralan. First, it is clear 
that the Court considers that there is a distinction between taking advantage of 
a provision or lacuna in legislation in order to pay less tax, i.e. VAT planning, 
and the creation of artiﬁ cial transactions entered into for the purpose of gain-
ing a tax advantage, i.e. VAT avoidance; the ﬁ rst constitutes a legitimate prac-
tice, the second is perceived as an undesirable activity. Second, it also estab-
lishes an unambiguous correlation between VAT avoidance and abuse of Com-
munity law.
3.1.2.  Halifax and the new principle of prohibition of abuse
On February 2006 the Court of Justice ﬁ nally delivered its eagerly awaited 
ruling in Halifax.119 The factual circumstances of the case were somewhat 
complex but can be summarized as follows: Halifax was a banking company 
and as such the vast majority of its supplies are tax -exempt ﬁ nancial services; 
in 1999, it took the decision to establish new ‘‘call centres’’ for the purposes of 
117. Id. at para 81.
118. Id. A.G.’s Opinion, at para 61.
119. Halifax, note 20 supra.
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its business; by virtue of the apportionment of tax rule in Article 174 of the 
CVSD, Halifax could have recovered only 5 percent of the VAT paid on any 
construction works; however, following advice from their tax advisers, Hali-
fax set up a scheme whereby it was able to recover effectively the full amount 
of input VAT incurred on the building works through a series of transactions 
involving different companies in the Halifax group. Following proceedings 
before the United Kingdom courts, the case was referred to the ECJ, which, 
amongst other issues, was asked whether the doctrine of abuse of rights, as 
developed in its case law, precluded a taxable person from exercising the right 
to deduct input VAT, where the transactions, on which that right was based, 
were effected for that exclusive purpose.
The Court conﬁ rmed that the principle of prohibiting of abuse also applied 
to the sphere of VAT, and therefore the CVSD should be interpreted as pre-
cluding any right of a taxable person to deduct input VAT where the transac-
tions from which that right derived constituted an abusive practice. The Court 
was keen to emphasize however that this principle did not preclude tax plan-
ning – “taxpayers may choose to structure their business so as to limit their tax 
liability”; only abusive practices were forbidden.120 In order to determine 
whether an abusive practice has taken place, the Court then set out a two-part 
test. An abusive practice will be found to exist where:
– the transactions concerned, notwithstanding formal application of the condi-
tions laid down by the relevant provisions of the Sixth Directive and the na-
tional legislation transposing it, resulted in the accrual of a tax advantage, the 
grant of which would be contrary to the purpose of those provisions; and
– it is apparent from a number of objective factors, such as the purely artiﬁ cial 
nature of the transactions and the links between operators involved in the 
scheme, that the essential aim of those transactions concerned was to obtain a 
tax advantage.121
According to the ECJ, it is for the national courts to verify in each speciﬁ c 
case, and in light of the evidence presented, whether these conditions are ful-
ﬁ lled and consequently, whether an abusive practice has taken place. Once 
such practice has been established, the transactions involved “must be rede-
ﬁ ned so as to re-establish the situation that would have prevailed in the ab-
sence of the transactions constituting that abusive practice.”122
120. Id. at para 73.
121. Id. at paras. 74, 75 and 81.
122. Id. at para 94.
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The ruling largely followed the Opinion of the Advocate General.123 In this 
Opinion, Advocate General Poiares Maduro had also adopted the view that the 
principle of prohibition of abuse of Community law, as he prefers to refer to 
it,124 did indeed apply to the ﬁ eld of VAT.125 Moreover, it had also set up a two-
part test in order to establish the existence of abusive practices. There was 
however, an important difference in this regard between the Opinion of the 
Advocate General and the ultimate ruling of the Court: the expression used by 
the Advocate General in the second part of the test, was “activities for which 
there is objectively no other explanation”; whilst the Court opted for the for-
mula “the essential aim” of the transactions, thus signiﬁ cantly widening the 
scope of the concept of abuse.
The decision in Halifax was therefore hardly surprising in light of both the 
Advocate General’s Opinion, and also earlier case law.126 Not only had the 
Court’s rulings on VAT cases delivered during the previous year paved the way 
for Halifax, but, equally, looking at the Court’s previous case law on abuse, 
Halifax arguably represented merely the culmination of years of developing 
an EC law concept of abuse. Particularly noteworthy are the clear inﬂ uences 
of Emsland-Stärke and the Centros line of case law. As regards Emsland-
Stärke the inﬂ uence is obvious: the test proposed by the Court in Halifax is 
virtually identical to the one proposed in that decision, with a few minor 
amendments, namely to its previously called “subjective element”.127 As far as 
the Centros line of case law is concerned, the inﬂ uence, albeit less evident, is 
of no less signiﬁ cance: the notion expressed both in Halifax, and in the im-
mediately preceding rulings, such as Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep, that 
“planning without abuse” is a legitimate activity, is reminiscent of the idea of 
123. Despite the intense controversy it had caused, the Opinion was generally seen as a pre-
emption of the Court’s ruling, see e.g. Brennan, “Why the ECJ should not follow Advocate-
General Poiares Maduro’s Opinion in Halifax”, (2005) International VAT Monitor July/August, 
247–254; and Cordara, ‘‘Halifax: a conservative opinion’’, (2005) BTR, 267–270.
124. According to the A.G., “the use of the term ‘abuse of rights’ … may actually be mis-
leading”, in Opinion of the A.G. in Halifax, BUPA, and University of Huddersﬁ eld, at para 71. 
The three cases were initially joined, however, the Court, ultimately, decided to issue separate 
rulings on each, see Halifax, note 20 supra; Case C-419/02, BUPA Hospitals Ltd, Goldsborough 
Developments Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise, [2006] ECR I-1685; Case C-223/03, 
University of Huddersﬁ eld Higher Education Corporation v. Commissioners of Customs & Ex-
cise, [2006] ECR I-1751.
125. Id. at paras. 70, 73 and 76.
126. See de la Feria, “Giving themselves extra (VAT)? The ECJ ruling in Halifax”, (2006) 
BTR, 119–123.
127. Probably in light of previous criticisms on the use of a subjective element in the test, see 
supra section 2.3.
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“legitimate circumvention” expressed both in Centros, and in the post-Centros 
decisions on establishment.128
Yet, despite its predictability, the ruling in Halifax gave rise to intense con-
troversy.129 Not least due to its implications for legal principles, such as ﬁ scal 
neutrality and legal certainty,130 which are of particular concern when consid-
ering taxation matters. From the outset, it was clear that further guidance 
would be required on the application of the abuse principle to VAT, and thus, 
that new cases were likely to arise in this area.131 However, no one seemed to 
doubt the landmark status of the Halifax decision for tax law.132 Unfortunately, 
the same could not be said of its signiﬁ cance for the development of a Com-
munity principle of prohibition of abuse of law, which seems to have passed 
virtually unnoticed. In the tax world, meanwhile, the attention turned to direct 
taxation, and to the question of whether the Court of Justice would also apply 
the newly designated principle to corporate tax law.
3.2. Direct taxation
The discussion around the applicability of the new principle of abuse to corpo-
rate tax matters started immediately after the decision in Halifax had been 
delivered.133 It is true that, even prior to Halifax, there had already been some 
128. Although, the criteria for establishing this “legitimacy” are not necessarily the same in 
both cases; indeed it is unclear whether the situation in Centros would have met the criteria for 
“legitimacy” established by the Court in Halifax, i.e. the abuse test. It certainly was an artiﬁ cial 
transaction, it might, however, have passed the test on the basis of its ﬁ rst element: the formal 
application of the freedom of establishment provisions to the circumstances of the case did not 
give rise to a result contrary to the purpose of those provisions, as interpreted by the Court.
129. For a comprehensive list of all the alleged “weaknesses” of the ruling, see Victoria 
Sanches, “El Concepto de Abuso de Derecho en el Ambito del IVA: El ‘Caso Halifax’”, (2006) 
Fiscal, 40–49.
130. See for the principle of ﬁ scal neutrality, Ridsdale, note 106 supra; for the principle of 
legal certainty, de la Feria, note 109 supra; and for an overall commentary on the consequences 
of the decision McCarthy, “Abuse of rights: The effect of the doctrine on VAT planning”, (2007) 
BTR, 160–174.
131. As the Court of Justice itself acknowledged, see Halifax, note 20 supra, at para 77. See 
also comments in de la Feria, note 109 supra, at 32. Events since seem to be proving predictions 
right, with the ﬁ rst case on the application of the abuse principle to VAT post-Halifax, already 
having been decided by the ECJ, see Case C-425/06, Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 
v. Part Service Srl, judgment of 21 Feb. 2008, nyr. Unfortunately, the Court failed to provide 
extra guidance in that case, preferring to refer the case back to the Italian courts for application 
of the new abuse test.
132. It has even been argued, with some success, that 21 Feb. 2006, now nicknamed “Hali-
fax Day”, marked the beginning of a new stage of evolution for the EU VAT system, see Swin-
kels, “Halifax Day: Abuse of Law in European VAT”, (2006) International VAT Monitor, May/
June, 173–181.
133. See Douma and Engelen, “Halifax plc v. Customs and Excise Commissioners: The ECJ 
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discussion of the potential effect of the Court’s jurisprudence on abuse of law 
matters on tax law,134 but Halifax gave it a new impetus. The focus of the dis-
cussion was around the different legal status of VAT and corporate tax, at EU 
level. VAT is a (broadly) harmonized tax, which forms part of the Communi-
ty’s own resources;135 thus, when applying the principle of prohibition of abuse 
of law to the VAT area, the Court of Justice had done so in the context of the 
CVSD provisions, i.e. at issue was abuse of Community law. On the contrary, 
corporate taxes have only been marginally harmonized,136 and do not form part 
of the Community’s own resources; thus if the Court was to apply the principle 
to corporate taxation, the issue would be primarily one of abuse of law, rather 
than abuse of Community law, as in most cases, there would be no Commu-
nity law to abuse in the ﬁ rst place.137 The Court ﬁ rst dealt with the more difﬁ -
cult matter of the applicability of the principle to non-harmonized direct tax 
law; only some months later did it deal with its applicability to harmonized 
direct tax law.
3.2.1. Cadbury Schweppes and non-harmonized direct tax law
Fortunately, there was not long to wait. Pending at the Court of Justice at the 
time of the Halifax ruling were already several cases, which would test the 
Court’s willingness to extend the application of the principle to corporate tax-
ation. In particular, there were some references concerning the use of so-called 
Controlled Foreign Companies (CFC) rules,138 whose compatibility with EC 
law had been questioned for some years.139 The ﬁ rst of these cases to be de-
applies the abuse of rights doctrine in VAT cases”, (2006) BTR, 429–440; and Rousselle and 
Liebman, “The doctrine of the abuse of Community law: The Sword of Damocles hanging over 
the head of EC corporate tax law?”, (2006) European Taxation, 559–564.
134. In addition to references included supra, see for a throughout commentary on the im-
plications for tax law of the Centros line of case law, Schön, “Playing different games? Regula-
tory competition in tax and company law compared”, (2005) CML Rev., 331–365.
135. For explanation of the signiﬁ cance of being part of the Community’s own resources for 
the abuse debate, see supra section 2.3.
136. As Wattel and Terra comment: “Positive harmonisation measures in the ﬁ eld of direct 
taxation currently in force amount to three directives on speciﬁ c tax problems of international 
groups of companies … and one directive on savings interest taxation”, see European Tax Law, 
4th ed. (Kluwer Law International, 2005), at p. 248.
137. Reﬂ ecting this reality, see discussion on the application of the principle only to poten-
tial cases of abuse of the existing Corporate Tax Directives, Rousselle and Liebman, op. cit. note 
133 supra, at 561–564. The argument is developed further below.
138. Broadly speaking, CFC rules are anti-avoidance measures aimed at preventing the di-
version of capital to low-tax jurisdictions, see for a more detailed explanation of how these rules 
usually work, Weber, Tax Avoidance and the EC Treaty Freedoms – A Study of the Limitations 
under European Law to the Prevention of Tax Avoidance (Eucotax Series, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2005) at pp. 121–122.
139. As far back as 2001, Schön questioned the compatibility of these rules, in light of, 
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cided by the Court (and thus, its critical test in the post-Halifax era) was Cad-
bury Schweppes.140
Cadbury Schweppes concerned the compatibility of United Kingdom CFC 
rules – which in this case had the effect of imposing a tax charge upon a 
United Kingdom parent company, on the proﬁ ts made by an Irish subsidiary 
– with the EC Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment.141 Before an-
swering this question, however, the ECJ considered that it was relevant to ﬁ rst 
consider the issue of “whether the fact that a company established in a Mem-
ber State establishes and capitalizes companies in another Member State sole-
ly because of the more favourable tax regime applicable in that Member State 
constitutes an abuse of freedom of establishment.”142 It therefore started by 
acknowledging that “[a] national of a Member State cannot attempt, under the 
cover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to circumvent national 
legislation” or “improperly or fraudulently take advantage of provisions of 
Community law.”143 Yet, it added that it followed from the decisions in Cen-
tros and Inspire Art that the establishment of subsidiaries in another Member 
State, such as Ireland, “for the purpose of beneﬁ ting from the favourable tax 
regime which that establishment enjoys does not in itself constitute abuse” 
(para 38).
The Court then proceeded to consider the compatibility of the United King-
dom CFC rules with freedom of establishment provisions. In this regard, it 
stated:
“The separate tax treatment under the legislation on CFCs and the result-
ing disadvantage for resident companies which have a subsidiary subject, 
in another Member State, to a lower level of taxation are such as to hinder 
the exercise of freedom of establishment by such companies, dissuading 
them from establishing, acquiring or maintaining a subsidiary in a Mem-
ber State in which the latter is subject to such a level of taxation. They 
therefore constitute a restriction on freedom of establishment within the 
meaning of Articles 43 and 48 EC.
 Such a restriction is permissible only if it is justiﬁ ed by overriding rea-
sons of public interest. It is further necessary, in such a case, that its ap-
plication be appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective thus 
pursued and not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.” (paras. 46 and 
47)
amongst others, the Court’s case law on what he designated as “abusive behaviour”, see “CFC 
Legislation and European Community Law”, (2001) BTR, 250–260, at 256. See also Lang, 
“CFC Legislation and Community Law”, (2002) European Taxation, 374–379.
140. Case C-196/04, [2006] ECR I-7995.
141. For a more detailed explanation of the United Kingdom CFC legislation and the factual 
circumstances of the case, see Cadbury Schweppes ruling, ibid., at paras. 3 to 28.
142. Id., at para 34.
143. Id., at para 35.
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The United Kingdom, supported by Denmark, Germany, France, Portugal, 
Finland and Sweden, had submitted that the CFC legislation was intended to 
counter tax avoidance, and was thus justiﬁ ed. The Court however considered 
that “it must be determined whether the restriction on freedom of establish-
ment arising from the legislation on CFCs may be justiﬁ ed on the ground of 
prevention of wholly artiﬁ cial arrangements and, if so, whether it is propor-
tionate in relation to that objective” (para 57). In this regard, invoking Emsland-
Stärke and Halifax, the Court pointed out that, in order to establish the exis-
tence of a “wholly artiﬁ cial arrangement”, there must be:
“In addition to a subjective element consisting of the intention to obtain a 
tax advantage, objective circumstances showing that, despite formal ob-
servance of the conditions laid down by Community law, the objective 
pursued by freedom of establishment … has not been achieved.
 In those circumstances, in order for the legislation on CFCs to comply 
with Community law, the taxation provided for by that legislation must be 
excluded where, despite the existence of tax motives, the incorporation of 
a CFC reﬂ ects economic reality.” (paras. 64 and 65)
Where this test is not satisﬁ ed and thus, according to the Court, the transac-
tions are deemed to be genuine, and not wholly artiﬁ cial, application of CFC 
rules is not justiﬁ ed. The ECJ therefore held: “Articles 43 EC and 48 EC must 
be interpreted as precluding the inclusion in the tax base of a resident company 
established in a Member State of proﬁ ts made by a CFC in another Member 
State, where those proﬁ ts are subject in that State to a lower level of taxation 
than that applicable in the ﬁ rst State, unless such inclusion relates only to 
wholly artiﬁ cial arrangements intended to escape the national tax normally 
payable” (para 75).
The signiﬁ cance of the ruling does not rest in the statement that establishing 
subsidiaries in another Member State, such as Ireland, for the purpose of ben-
eﬁ ting from the favourable tax regime which that establishment enjoys, does 
not in itself constitute abuse. The legitimacy of so-called “tax location shop-
ping” could have already been inferred from the Centros’ line of case law.144 
Nor in the Court’s reference to “wholly artiﬁ cial arrangements”. In ICI the 
Court had already held that national legislation, which restricts the exercise of 
the freedom of establishment, could only be justiﬁ ed where it had “the spe-
144. See Panayi, Double Taxation, Tax Treaties, Treaty Shopping and the European Com-
munity (Eucotax Series, Kluwer Law International, 2007) at pp. 179–193; also O’Shea, “The 
UK’s CFC rules and the freedom of establishment: Cadbury Schweppes plc and its IFSC sub-
sidiaries – tax avoidance or tax mitigation?”, (2007) EC Tax Review, 13–33, at 21 and 29.
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ciﬁ c purpose of preventing wholly artiﬁ cial arrangements.”145 Rather, the nov-
elty of Cadbury Schweppes rests in the deﬁ nition of “wholly artiﬁ cial arrange-
ment” employed by the Court. Indeed, the use by the Court, as well as the 
Advocate General Léger,146 of the abuse test, as set out in Halifax, in order to 
deﬁ ne wholly artiﬁ cial transactions, has signiﬁ cant implications for both the 
Community concept of abuse of law, and the scope of its application.
First, and perhaps more obviously, it is interesting to note that the two con-
cepts – “wholly artiﬁ cial transactions” and “abuse of law” – are equated in the 
ruling.147 This is a slightly different approach from that adopted in Halifax, 
where the Court (but not the Advocate General) considered that the concept of 
abuse of law would cover situations where “the essential aim of the transac-
tions was to obtain a tax advantage”.148 This raises the obvious question of 
whether in future cases, the abuse test could be extended to “mainly artiﬁ cial 
transactions”, in other areas beyond VAT.149 Second, the ruling in Cadbury 
Schweppes seems to narrow down the scope of “legitimate circumvention”, as 
set out in Centros, Überseering and Inspire Art and later imported into the case 
law on movement of workers and citizenship; at the same time, the concept of 
abuse seems to have been enlarged. In those cases the artiﬁ ciality of the ar-
rangements was not deemed relevant for establishing the existence of abuse, 
but in Cadbury Schweppes abuse and artiﬁ ciality were regarded as closely 
related concepts.150 This also raises the question of whether the Court will now 
reassess its approach to abuse in the context of company law, free movement 
of workers, and EU citizenship areas. Thus, it follows from the two points 
above that the concept of abuse of law applied by the Court in Cadbury 
Schweppes appears to be narrower than that applied in some other areas of EU 
law, namely VAT; but broader than that applied in other areas of EU law, such 
145. Case C-264/96, Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v. Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her 
Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), [1998] ECR I-4695, para 26. This approach was conﬁ rmed in 
later cases, see Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt Steinfurt, [2002] ECR 
I-11779, para 37; Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Économie, des 
Finances et de l’Industrie, [2004] ECR I-2409, para 50; and Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer 
plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of Taxes), [2005] ECR I-10837, para 57.
146. See Opinion of the A.G. in Cadbury Schweppes, note 140 supra, at paras. 117 to 122.
147. See Edwards and Farmer, “The concept of abuse in the freedom of establishment of 
companies: A case of double standards?”, (forthcoming).
148. See supra section 3.1.
149. The “mainly for tax purposes” approach has also been suggested by Pistone, “The need 
for tax clarity and the application of the Acte Clair doctrine to direct taxes”, (2007) Intertax, 
534–536, at 535. See for a different approach, Meussen, “Cadbury Schweppes: The ECJ sig-
niﬁ cantly limits the application of CFC rules in the Member States”, (2007) European Taxation, 
13–17, at 16.
150. For a comprehensive analysis of the conceptual differences between Centros and Cad-
bury Schweppes, see Edwards and Farmer, note 147 supra.
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as company law, workers and citizens. In this regard, the concept of artiﬁ cial-
ity is central, as follows:
– no abuse, regardless of artiﬁ cial nature of the transactions (Centros, Akrich, 
Chen);
– abuse is established, only where existence of wholly artiﬁ cial arrangements 
is determined (Cadbury Schweppes);
– abuse is established, even where the arrangements are not wholly artiﬁ cial, 
but only mainly artiﬁ cial (Halifax).
Finally, from the perspective of the scope of application of the Community’s 
concept of abuse of law, the Cadbury Schweppes ruling is also signiﬁ cant. 
What the Court seems to have done in that judgment was to broaden the scope 
of application of the EC concept of abuse of law, rather than broaden the con-
cept of abuse of law itself. In Halifax, Advocate General Poiares Maduro 
spoke of prohibition of abuse of Community law, and it was clear to everyone 
which Community law was potentially being abused in that case: the CVSD. 
Although not using the same terminology, the same could be said of most, if 
not all, cases involving abuse of law claims, where the Community law alleg-
edly abused was always identiﬁ able. Arguably, this was not the case in Cad-
bury Schweppes. Of course, it could be said that the Court’s analysis was un-
dertaken on the basis of freedom of establishment, and that in Cadbury 
Schweppes, what the Court did was merely to deﬁ ne what constitutes abuse of 
that freedom. However, abuse of a freedom presupposes the formal exercise of 
a right granted by that same freedom. Is this the case as regards the setting up 
of subsidiaries? Is the possibility of establishing a subsidiary in another Mem-
ber State a right which is conferred merely by the freedom of establishment 
provisions in the EC Treaty? Moreover, are CFC rules meant to counteract 
situations of abuse of freedom of establishment? The answer to all these ques-
tions is, possibly, no.
As the Court explained in Cadbury Schweppes, CFC rules can indeed re-
strict freedom of establishment, but that is not their principal aim. Their prin-
cipal aim is to prevent an international form of tax avoidance, the so-called 
proﬁ t shifting to low tax jurisdictions, which, although it can take place be-
tween companies established within the EU, more often than not, will involve 
companies established outside EU territory.151 The international nature of the 
phenomenon challenges the presumption that it constitutes the exercise of a 
151. The international nature of the phenomenon is highlighted by the fact that the idea for 
CFC rules was initially developed in the United States, and that the OECD itself has recom-
mended their introduction to its members, see Lang, op. cit. note 139 supra, at 374.
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right granted by the EC Treaty. Thus, the fact that CFC rules can hinder free-
dom of establishment, as the Court successfully argues, does not imply neces-
sarily that they are designed to counteract abuse of that freedom. Inclusion 
within the scope of the freedom of establishment should not be equated to the 
exercise of rights granted by that same freedom. It follows that the application 
in Cadbury Schweppes of the EC concept of abuse as a potential justiﬁ cation 
for application of CFC rules does not fall within the scope of “prohibition of 
abuse of Community law”, but rather more generally within “prohibition of 
abuse of law”. What the Court appears to have done in Cadbury Schweppes 
therefore was to initiate the process of harmonizing the concept of abuse of 
law, i.e. using the same concept of abuse of law for all cross-border transac-
tions within the internal market, even if the right being exercised is not granted 
by Community law.152
This process has continued in Thin Cap Group Litigation.153 The case con-
cerned the compatibility of the United Kingdom anti-tax avoidance legisla-
tion, known as thin capitalization rules, with Community law, and in particular 
the freedom of establishment provisions.154 Considering that the rules were in 
principle a restriction on freedom of establishment, the Court then went on to 
consider the “ﬁ ght against abuse practices” as a potential justiﬁ cation for that 
restriction.155 In this regard, it reiterated its ruling in Cadbury Schweppes, stat-
ing:
“According to established case law, a national measure restricting freedom 
of establishment may be justiﬁ ed where it speciﬁ cally targets wholly arti-
ﬁ cial arrangements designed to circumvent the legislation of the Member 
State concerned…
 The mere fact that a resident company is granted a loan by a related 
company which is established in another Member State cannot be the basis 
152. A process which has been designated as “Europeanization” of the concept of abuse, see 
Vanistendael, “Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes: one single European theory of abuse of tax 
law”, (2006) EC Tax Review, 192–195, at 194. See also Fontana, “The Uncertain Future of CFC 
Regimes in the Member States of the European Union – Part 2”, (2006) European Taxation, 
317–334, at 327–328. The inﬂ uence of the EU concept of abuse of law is even being felt in the 
country widely credited with formulating the original abus de droit doctrine, France, see Le-
clercq, “Interacting principles: The French abuse of law concept and the EU notion of abusive 
practices”, (2007) Bulletin for International Taxation, 235–244.
153. Case C-524/04, Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v. Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue, [2007] ECR I-2107.
154. Broadly speaking, under thin capitalization rules, loan interest paid by resident sub-
sidiary to a non-resident parent (which is deductible by the subsidiary as business expenses) 
may under certain conditions be re-qualiﬁ ed as dividend payments (which are taxable as sub-
sidiary’s proﬁ ts). Most, but not all, Member States apply some form of thin capitalization rules, 
see European Tax Surveys (Including Tax Treaties), IBFD Database.
155. Thin Capitalization Group Litigation, note 153 supra, at paras. 71 et seq.
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of a general presumption of abusive practices and justify a measure which 
compromises the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty…
 In order for a restriction on the freedom of establishment to be justiﬁ ed 
on the ground of prevention of abusive practices, the speciﬁ c objective of 
such a restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the creation of 
wholly artiﬁ cial arrangements which do not reﬂ ect economic reality, with 
a view to escaping the tax normally due on the proﬁ ts generated by activi-
ties carried out on national territory…”156
Ultimately, the Court considered that the United Kingdom legislation would 
not respect proportionality, and thus could be regarded as incompatible with 
the EC Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment unless “that legislation 
provides for a consideration of objective and veriﬁ able elements which make 
it possible to identify the existence of a purely artiﬁ cial arrangement, entered 
into for tax reasons alone, and allows taxpayers to produce, if appropriate and 
without being subject to undue administrative constraints, evidence as to the 
commercial justiﬁ cation for the transaction in question.”157
Although the Court does not refer speciﬁ cally to Halifax in the ruling, the 
elements of the abuse test set out in that ruling are still present here, and it is 
clear that the concept of abuse used in this ruling is identical to that used in 
Cadbury Schweppes. What is more, the comments made above as regards the 
international nature of the proﬁ t shifting phenomenon, which CFC rules aimed 
at combating, apply, mutatis mutandis, to thin capitalization.
The most recent development as regards the application of the EC concept 
of abuse of law to direct taxation cases has been Columbus Container Servic-
es, a case again concerning the application of CFC rules, this time in Germa-
ny.158 Surprisingly, the Court in that case considered that the German CFC 
rules did not in fact constitute a restriction of the freedom of establishment 
(nor of free movement of capital).159 Advocate General Mengozzi however 
held a different view.160 In his Opinion, he discusses thoroughly the possible 
justiﬁ cation of the German CFC rules as a measure aimed at “ﬁ ghting wholly 
artiﬁ cial arrangements”. Replying to the argument, put forward by the German 
156. Id., at paras. 72 to 74.
157. Id., at para 92.
158. For an explanation of the background to this case and the German CFC legislation, see 
Schnitger, “German CFC legislation pending before the European Court of Justice – abuse of 
law and revival of the most-favoured-nation-clause”, (2006) EC Tax Review, 151–160, at 155–
160.
159. Case C-298/05, Judgment of 6 Dec. 2007, nyr.
160. Id., Opinion of 27 March 2007, nyr, and, at the time of writing, only available in the 
following languages: Spanish, Czech, Danish, German, French, Italian, Latvian, Maltese, Portu-
guese, Slovene, Finish and Swedish.
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Government, that the Court’s interpretation of what constitutes wholly artiﬁ -
cial arrangements was too restrictive, the Advocate General stated that he saw 
no reason why the Court should depart from its ruling in Cadbury Schweppes.161 
Unfortunately, the ECJ did not consider these issues in its ruling, as the con-
clusion that the German CFC legislation did not constitute a restriction made 
unnecessary any discussion over potential justiﬁ cations. The matter has there-
fore been left open to debate: will the Court in forthcoming cases follow the 
same approach as in Cadbury Schweppes as regards wholly artiﬁ cial arrange-
ments, or will it be willing to revisit the abuse of law test, bringing it even 
closer to the one used in Halifax? Hopefully, further guidance will soon be 
available, as opportunities for further guidance on the application of the EC 
concept of abuse of law to direct taxation cases, in areas where no harmoniza-
tion has taken place, are certainly likely to materialize in the near future.162
3.2.2. Merger Directive and abuse of law in harmonized direct tax law
The inﬂ uence of Halifax has also extended to the Corporate Tax Directives. 
Soon after Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Capitalization Group Litigation, the 
Court issued its ruling in Kofoed.163 The case concerned the charging of in-
come tax in respect of an exchange of shares undertaken by Mr Kofoed. 
Amongst other aspects, the case focused on the interpretation of an anti-abuse 
clause set out in Article 11(1)(a) of the Merger Directive.164 This clause pro-
vides that a Member State may refuse to apply or withdraw the beneﬁ t of all 
or any part of the provisions set out in the Directive, where it appears that the 
exchange of shares has tax evasion or tax avoidance as its principal or as one 
of its principal objectives.165 Invoking the decisions in both Halifax and Cad-
161. Id. at paras. 169 and 176, translated from the Portuguese version.
162. In 2005 another case concerning United Kingdom CFC rules and their compatibility 
with Community law was also referred to the ECJ, Case C-203/05, Vodafone 2, O.J. 2005, C 
182/29. The case was said to “raise new issues regarding the justiﬁ cation based on the risk of tax 
avoidance and the controversial EC law concept of abuse in respect of direct taxation”, see 
Fontana, op. cit. note 152 supra, at 318–319. The referral was, however, withdrawn by the UK 
Special Commissioners, following the ruling in Cadbury Schweppes on the basis of the “clear 
guidance” provided by the Court in that case. This view has nevertheless been challenged by 
Vodafone, which is said to be considering appeal of the decision not to refer the case, see Ayoyo, 
“UK Special Commissioners Withdraw ECJ Referral of CFC Case”, (2007) Tax Notes Interna-
tional, 662.
163. Case C-321/05, Kofoed, judgment of 5 July 2007, nyr.
164. Council Directive 90/434/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation ap-
plicable to mergers, divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies 
of different Member States, O.J. 1990, L 225/1.
165. It is interesting to note that this provision has been designated as “redundant” in light of 
the Court of Justice’s previous case law, see Terra and Wattel, op. cit. note 136 supra, at 571.
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bury Schweppes, the Court, following the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott 
almost to the letter, stated:
“Article 11(1)(a) of Directive 90/434 reﬂ ects the general Community law 
principle that abuse of rights is prohibited. Individuals must not improp-
erly or fraudulently take advantage of provisions of Community law. The 
application of Community legislation cannot be extended to cover abusive 
practices, that is to say, transactions carried out not in the context of nor-
mal commercial operations, but solely for the purpose of wrongfully ob-
taining advantages provided for by Community law.”166
Although the ruling was not the ﬁ rst concerning the interpretation of the Merg-
er Directive’s anti-abuse clause,167 its relevance should be read in the context 
of the previous tax cases on abuse and abusive practices. In this regard, three 
aspects are worthy of emphasis: ﬁ rst, the Court’s speciﬁ c reference to Halifax 
and Cadbury Schweppes, indicating that this ruling is part of a new approach 
to abuse of law within the tax ﬁ eld; second, the fact that the Court uses a 
slightly different language from that used in those cases raises the question of 
whether this is yet another abuse criterion;168 ﬁ nally, and most importantly, the 
Court’s reference to prohibition of abuse of law as a “general Community law 
principle”.
4. Assessment of the Court’s case law: Is the prohibition of abuse
 of law a new general principle of Community law?
The signiﬁ cance of the extension of the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on 
abuse and abusive practices to taxation matters is evident, primarily from a tax 
law perspective.169 The Commission itself has acknowledged this fact in a re-
166. Kofoed, note 163 supra, at para 38; and Opinion of the A.G., at para 58.
167. See Case C-28/95, A. Leur-Bloem v. Inspecteur der Belastingdienst/Ondernemingen 
Amsterdam 2, [1997] ECR I-4161; and comments of Zalasinski, “Proportionality of anti-
avoidance and anti-abuse measures in the ECJ’s Direct Tax Case Law”, (2007) Intertax, 310–
321, at 316. See also Zalasinksi “Case-law-based anti-avoidance measures in conﬂ ict with pro-
portionality test: Comment on the ECJ Decision in Kofoed”, (2007) ET, 571–576.
168. As Pistone comments “Reference to normal commercial operations could signiﬁ cantly 
broaden the scope of justiﬁ cations based on anti-abuse grounds. After the Kofoed decision one 
could even conclude that not only may there be one notion of abuse for secondary law in the 
ﬁ eld of VAT and a different one for direct taxes, but also that the latter notion may differ accord-
ing to whether we are dealing with fundamental freedoms (as in Cadbury Schweppes), or with a 
harmonized domain (as in Kofoed)”, in op. cit. note 149 supra, at 535.
169. Following the decision in Cadbury Schweppes, several Member States are reassessing 
their CFC legislation; see Taylor and Sykes, “Controlled Foreign Companies and Foreign Prof-
its”, (2007) BTR, 609–647. For an exclusively UK perspective see also Whitehead, “Practical 
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cent communication, where it expresses its willingness to “support and assist 
Member States” in conducting a review of their anti-avoidance rules, in order 
to bring them in line with the ECJ case law in this area.170 Perhaps less evident, 
however, and certainly much less debated, is the impact of these rulings upon 
the EU legal system, namely whether they amount to the creation of prohibi-
tion of abuse of law as a new general principle of Community law. The Court 
seems to be indicating that it favours this approach;171 and so do some former 
and current advocates general,172 the Commission,173 and various tax law com-
mentators.174 Yet, looking at the last thirty years, since the ruling in Van Bins-
bergen, it is clear that there has been no consensus on this matter, even amongst 
those groups mentioned above, and that a thorough debate has yet to take 
place.
4.1. Concept of general principle of Community law
It is a well-known fact that the only provision in the EC Treaty that refers to 
general principles is Article 288, which in its second paragraph refers to “the 
general principles common to the laws of the Member States”, in the context 
of non-contractual liability.175 Yet, the key nature of their role within the EU 
legal system is undeniable. Created by the Court of Justice, through a process, 
which has been designated as “legitimate judicial activism”,176 general prin-
ciples of Community law are regarded as an increasingly fundamental177 “gap 
implications arising from the European Court’s recent decisions concerning CFC legislation and 
dividend taxation”, (2007) EC Tax Review, 176–183; and Baker, “Are the 2006 Amendments to 
the CFC legislation compatible with Community law”, (2007) BTR, 1–6.
170. See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and 
the European Economic and Social Committee, The application of anti-abuse measures in the 
area of direct taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries, COM(2007)785 ﬁ nal, 
10 Dec. 2007.
171. See Halifax, note 20 supra, at para 70; and Kofoed, note 163 supra, at para 58.
172. A.G. Kokott in Centralan, note 116 supra, at para 81, and in Kofoed, note 163 supra, at 
para 49. For views expressed beyond the tax cases, see also references below.
173. Opinion of the A.G. Poiares Maduro in Halifax, note 20 supra, at para 69.
174. Although it is clear that here the statement is often based on a presumption for the exist-
ence of the principle, rather than on actual arguments, see Pistone, op. cit. note 149 supra, at 
535; Zalasinski, op. cit. note 167 supra, at 314; and Douma and Engelen, op. cit. note 133 supra, 
at 436.
175. Although Art. 6(2) TEU also includes a reference to “general principles of Community 
law”, in the context of human rights protection.
176. See Groussot, General Principles of Community Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2006) 
at p. 9. Arnull points to the creation of general principles as “one of the Court’s most remarkable 
and inspired initiatives”, op. cit. note 89 supra, at p. 335.
177. See Nergelius, op. cit. note 22 supra; and Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, 
2nd ed.. (OUP, 2006), at p. 10.
COLA2008030.indd   434 3/19/2008   1:14:30 PM
Abuse of law 435
ﬁ lling” mechanism in face of the incomplete character of the EU legal or-
der.178
Although what is exactly a general principle of Community law is difﬁ cult 
to deﬁ ne and there is no apparent full doctrinal agreement,179 three main char-
acteristics have been proposed as essential:
– Generality – a principle should have, not only a level of abstraction which 
distinguishes it from a speciﬁ c rule, but equally, a degree of recognition by a 
relevant constituency, such as the courts.180
– Weight – a principle must express a core value of an area of law or the legal 
system as a whole; although the degree of importance of that value might di-
verge from principle to principle.181
– Non-conclusiveness – a principle does not necessitate a decision, but rather 
point towards a decision, i.e. it is “orientative”, rather than conclusive.182
In formulating these general principles, the Court draws inspiration from 
different sources, the most important of which are the laws of the Member 
States. This process, which has been designated as “re-transplantation”,183 
means in practice that principles which are common to most of the Member 
States’ legal systems, but not necessarily all, will become principles of Com-
munity law.184
In light of the above, the question which should be asked is whether the case 
law of the Court of Justice on abuse of law and abusive practices displays the 
characteristics inherent to the development of a general principle of Commu-
nity law.
178. Tridimas, ibid, at note 12; and Groussot, “The General Principles of Community Law 
in the creation and development of due process principles in competition law proceedings: From 
Trans ocean Marine Paint (1974) to Montecatini (1999)”, in Bernitz and Nergelius, op. cit. note 
22 supra, pp. 185–204, at 187.
179. See Groussot, op. cit. note 176 supra, at pp. 129–130.
180. Ibid., note 181, at pp. 127–130; and Tridimas, op. cit. note 177 supra, at p. 1.
181. Tridimas, ibid.
182. Groussot, op. cit. note 176 supra, at p. 128.
183. De Búrca, “Proportionality and subsidiarity as general principles of law”, in Bernitz 
and Nergelius, op. cit. note 22 supra, pp. 95–112.
184. As Hartley points out “whatever the factual origin of the principle, it is applied by the 
European Court as a principle of Community law, not national law”, see The Foundations of 
European Community Law, 5th ed. (OUP, 2003), at p. 134. The legitimacy of this interpretation 
appears to have its origins in the Court of Justice’s ruling in Werhahn and Others, Cases 63–
69/72, [1973] ECR 1229; see Usher, “The Reception of General Principles of Community Law 
in the United Kingdom”, (2005) EBLR, 489–510, at 490–491.
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4.2. Does the case law on prohibition of abuse of law amount to a general
 principle of Community law?
Until the 1990s, scant attention seems to have been paid to the Court of Jus-
tice’s consistent allusions within its jurisprudence to abuse and abusive prac-
tices. From then onwards, however, sporadic examination of the meaning of 
those references, and on whether they amounted to a general principle of Com-
munity law, started appearing, ﬁ rst within the Opinions of advocates general, 
then slowly spreading to the literature. Before the tax rulings, there were three 
main strands of opinion: those few who considered that the references within 
the case law amounted to the development of a general principle of Commu-
nity law;185 those who did not;186 and those who showed some scepticism, al-
beit without reaching a deﬁ nite conclusion.187 After the latest tax rulings, there 
is yet a fourth strand: those who believe that the references in the ECJ jurispru-
dence do amount to a principle of Community law, but not a general one, and 
rather an interpretative one, or a “principle of construction”.188
Four main arguments have been presented by those who doubted the exis-
tence of a general Community principle of abuse of law: ﬁ rstly, the fact that 
the existence of such a principle had never been recognized by the Court;189 
secondly, that abuse of rights is a principle that not all Member States apply in 
their own domestic systems;190 thirdly, that there is no precise Community 
meaning for abuse of law, or speciﬁ c criteria in this regard;191 and ﬁ nally that 
185. See Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Cases C-34–36/95, Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. 
De Agostini (Svenska) Förlag AB and TV-Shop i Sverige AB, [1997] ECR I-3843, para 45; Opin-
ion of A.G. La Pergola in Centros, note 48 supra, at para 20; arguments of the Commission in 
Emsland-Stärke, note 14 supra, at para 38; Weber, op. cit. note 71 supra, at 54; Engsig Sørensen, 
op. cit. note 17 supra.
186. See Opinion of A.G. Tesauro in Paﬁ tis, note 8 supra, at para 28, and in Kefalas, note 7 
supra, at paras. 18–27; Triantafyllou, annotation of Kefalas, “Abuse of rights versus primacy”, 
(1999) CML Rev., 157–164, at 161–162; and Kjellgren, note 15 supra, at 190. See also Brown, 
who although considering that the case law of the Court at the time did not amount to a general 
principle, suggested that abuse of law should be developed as such by the Court in future, note 
3 supra, at 511.
187. See Opinion of A.G. Lenz in TV10, note 4 supra, at para 25; Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed 
in Akrich, note 81 supra, at para 173; and Opinion of A.G. Tizzano in Chen, note 90 supra, at 
para 111.
188. See Opinion of A.G. Poiares Maduro in Halifax, note 20 supra, at para 69; Edwards and 
Farmer, note 147 supra; and Rousselle and Liebman, note 133 supra, at 562.
189. As recently as 2000, Kjellgren noted that the Court had never, until then, recognized the 
existence of the principle, “on the contrary, especially in the earlier cases, such an existence has 
been expressly denied”, in note 15 supra, at 190.
190. A.G. Tesauro in Kefalas, note 7 supra, paras 18–27; A.G. Tizzano in Chen, note 90 
supra, at para 111.
191. A.G. Geelhoed in Akrich, note 81 supra, at para 173.
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the references by the Court to abuse are inchoate and inconsistently applied.192 
Arguably most of these arguments were convincing prior to the tax rulings. It 
is, however, increasingly hard to see them as compelling in light of the most 
recent developments. In Halifax and Kofoed the Court expressly referred to 
the “principle of prohibiting abusive practices” and the “general Community 
law principle that abuse of rights is prohibited”, respectively.193 Whilst it is 
true that that not all Member States apply a principle of abuse of law, or abuse 
of rights, in their own domestic systems, it is also true that the majority do ap-
ply it; furthermore, it has long been accepted that in order for a general prin-
ciple of Community law to be created it is not necessary that the principle 
applies in all Member States, but merely in most.194 As already discussed, it is 
true that the Community concept of abuse of law has neither been developed 
by the Court in a fully coherent manner, nor consistently applied across the 
different areas of Community law.195 However, the Court’s most recent case 
law, in particular since Emsland-Stärke and Halifax, has identiﬁ ed core ele-
ments of a Community concept of abuse of law through the development of 
the “abuse test”, which have been applied across different (albeit admittedly 
not all) areas of Community law. To the potential counter-argument that core 
conceptual elements and partial applicability are not sufﬁ cient in order to es-
tablish the existence of a general principle of Community law, it should be 
answered that the general assumption is that general principles are “open prin-
ciples”, their development being part of a dynamic process, generated and led 
by the Court of Justice,196 and thus they do not spring into existence in their 
ﬁ nal, fully ﬂ edged, form.197
Should the prohibition of abuse of law be regarded merely as a principle of 
construction, rather than a general principle of Community law? In most cases 
192. Brown, op. cit. note 3 supra, at p. 511.
193. In this regard, the inﬂ uencing role of the Advocates General in these cases, and in par-
ticular that of A.G. Poiares Maduro in Halifax, should not be underestimated. Although, as it has 
been pointed out that there are “difﬁ culties inherent in assessing the contribution of the Advo-
cate General to the work of the Court or to the development of principles of Community law”, 
it is also acknowledged that one of their most signiﬁ cant roles has been that of “extrapolation 
from the laws of the Member States of unwritten general principles of law as sources of Com-
munity rights and obligations”, see Burrows and Greaves, The Advocate General and EC Law 
(OUP, 2007), at p. 7 and Tridimas, “The role of the Advocate General in the development of 
Community Law: Some reﬂ ections”, (1997) CML Rev., 1349–1387, at 1386.
194. See Lorenz, “General Principles of Law: Their Elaboration in the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities”, (1964) American Journal of Comparative Law, 1–29, at 7–9.
195. See supra section 3.2.
196. See Groussot, op. cit. note 89 supra.
197. Another general principle of EU law, proportionality, for example, although enshrined 
in the EC Treaty, still required further years of ECJ jurisprudential development before it could 
be said to constitute a fully-ﬂ edged general legal principle.
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the answer to this question will be irrelevant from a practical perspective, as 
general principles of Community law also operate in practice as interpretative 
aids for Community legal measures.198 There are, however, situations where 
the distinction can be practically relevant: beyond their role as interpretative 
aids and “gap ﬁ llers”, general principles can also act as overriding rules of 
law.199 Arguably, it was in this second capacity that the Community principle 
of prohibition of abuse of law was applied, in Cadbury Schweppes, by the 
Court of Justice: used to strike down a domestic legal provision on the basis 
that it did not comply with the Community abuse of law concept, as developed 
by the Court in previous case law. It follows that Cadbury Schweppes could be 
regarded as the ﬁ nal conﬁ rmation of prohibition of abuse of law, not only as a 
Community interpretative principle, but as a general principle of Community 
law, capable of being used as an instrument of judicial review where national 
legislation falls within the scope of Community law. The fact that the ECJ has 
not applied the principle for the purposes of judicial review uniformly, across 
all areas of EC law, should not be regarded as an obstacle to this conclusion. 
The intensity of judicial review exercised by the Court on the basis of the ap-
plication of general principles of EC law can, and often does, vary depending 
on the subject matter – a phenomenon which has been designated within con-
stitutional law literature as the “sliding scale of judicial review”.200
Overall, the contributions of Court of the Justice decisions within the ﬁ eld 
of tax law, towards the creation of a general principle of prohibition of abuse 
of law, are clear and can be summarized as follows:
198. As Farmer points out, op. cit. note 19 supra, at 16; see also A.G. Poiares Maduro’s com-
ments in Halifax, note 20 supra, at footnote 62.
199. See Nergelius, op. cit. note 22 supra, at 227.
200. See Gerards, “Intensity of judicial review in equal treatment cases”, (2004) Nether-
lands International Law Review, 135–183; Lavrijssen and de Visser, “Independent administra-
tive authorities and the standard of judicial review”, (2006) Utrecht Law Review, 111–135; and 
Doukas, Werbefreiheit und Werbebeschränkungen: Eine europa- und grundrechtliche Untersu-
chung der Kontrollmaßstäbe für Beschränkungen der kommerziellen Kommunikation, dar-
gestellt am EG-Recht, an der EMRK, am deutschen Grundgesetz und an der griechischen Ver-
fassung, Materialien zur interdisziplinären Medienforschung, No. 49 (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
2005). Once again using the principle of proportionality as an example, the extent of the judicial 
review on the basis of this principle has raged from strict, in areas such as fundamental rights, to 
less intensive in areas such as social policy. For an example of the ﬁ rst type, see Case C -353/99 
P, Council v. Hautala, [2001] ECR I-9565, where the Court annulled a Council decision denying 
a MEP access to a Council document on the basis that the aim pursued (public interest in inter-
national relations) could be achieved through measures which would be less restrictive of the 
right to information; for an example of the second type, see Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v. 
Council (Working Time Directive), [1996] ECR I-5755, where the Court held that the Working 
Time Directive did not breach proportionality as the Council must be allowed a wide discretion 
in social policy areas.
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– streamlining of the Community concept of abuse of law, in particular through 
the development of an “abuse test” (Halifax);
– recognition by the Court of Justice and other EU institutions, such as the 
Commission, of the existence of the principle of abuse of law (Halifax, Ko-
foed);
– extension of the ﬁ eld of application of this principle, through its use as an 
instrument of judicial review of national legal measures falling within the 
scope of EC law (Cadbury Schweppes).
Following these contributions, the characteristics usually attributed to gen-
eral principles of Community law, i.e. generality, weight and non-conclusive-
ness, are arguably all present in the Court’s jurisprudence on prohibition of 
abuse of law.
The diagram on the next page is an attempt at summarizing the ﬁ eld of ap-
plication of the new Community general principle of prohibition of abuse of 
law.
5. Conclusion
It has recently been said that, although tax law tends to be portrayed as a dis-
crete, dry and somewhat dull area of law, the recent Court of Justice jurispru-
dence in this ﬁ eld does not ﬁ t the bill.201 These are indeed changing, and chal-
lenging, times: who would have guessed that from such a sensitive ﬁ eld of 
law,202 where at EU level unanimity voting rules run supreme and harmoniza-
tion is limited to speciﬁ c areas, would emerge a new general principle of Com-
munity law – a principle whose effects will be ﬁ rmly felt beyond tax law.203
Paradoxically, whilst the more recent Court’s rulings within the ﬁ eld of tax 
law are the culmination of a process leading to the creation of a general prin-
ciple of prohibition of abuse of law, they also constitute the initial stages of 
that other dynamic process, which governs the development of all general 
principles of Community law. Further clariﬁ cation is likely to be requested 
from the ECJ, not only as regards the more theoretical aspects of the principle, 
such as the Community’s concept of abuse of law, but also its more practical 
consequences and/or implications, such as the principle’s scope of application, 
201. See Kingston, “A light in the darkness: Recent developments in the ECJ’s direct tax 
jurisprudence”, (2007) CML Rev., 1321–1359, at 1321.
202. See Snell, “Non-discriminatory tax obstacles in Community law”, (2007) ICLQ, 339–
370, esp. 356 et seq.
203. For an interesting analysis of the creeping inﬂ uence of general principles of Commu-
nity law upon national legal systems, see Usher, note 184 supra; and also Boyron, “General 
principles of law and national courts: applying a jus commune?”, 23 EL Rev. (1998), 171–178.
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onus of proof, available remedies, etc. Particularly interesting, in light of the 
case law to date, are the questions of whether (or rather when) the application 
of the principle will spread to the other areas of EU law – such as free move-
ment of persons and citizenship, where the Court has so far consistently dis-
missed allegations of abuse of law – and if so, what will be the scope of the 
judicial review in light of that principle.
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By recognizing prohibition of abuse of law as a general principle of Com-
munity law, the Court has essentially entered terra incognita. The process is 
now likely to create a momentum of its own, leading to the loss of the control 
which the Court has so far been able to exercise. While the case law on abuse 
and abusive practices remained patchy and vague, it was potentially easier for 
the Court to dismiss its application whenever policy considerations dictated a 
different result. Such an approach will be much harder to sustain when apply-
ing a general principle of Community law. Ultimately, however, all this dy-
namic process is heavily dependent on one single factor, which is yet to 
emerge: an increased awareness by the wider legal community of the signiﬁ -
cance of the recent events within the ﬁ eld of tax law.
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